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Abstract: This study aims to i) disentangle the white man’s overt tendency of 
denigrating indigenous agency to ethnic identity and, through the narrative of the Miskitu 
people of Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast, display that this frequent ethnic categorization 
oversimplifies a complex cultural identity; ii) bring to the fore the heterogeneity inherent 
to even the most seemingly unanimous ethnic groups; iii) illustrate the influence of 
contingent events in shaping the course of history; and iv) demonstrate that without 
individuals, history would be nonexistent—in other words, individuals matter. Through 
relaying the story of the Miskitu Indians in their violent resistance against the 
Revolutionary Sandinistas, I respond contrarily to some of the relevant literature’s widely 
held assumptions regarding Miskitu homogeneity, aspirations, and identity. This is 
achieved through chronicling the period leading to war, the conflict itself, and the long 
return to peace and respectively analyzing the Miskitu reasons for collective resistance, 
their motives in supporting either side of the fragmented leadership, and their ultimate 
decision to lay down arms. It argues that ethnic identity played a minimal role in 
escalating the Miskitu resistance, that the broader movement did not always align 
ideologically with its representative bodies throughout, and that the Miskitu proved more 
heterogeneous as a group than typically accredited. Accordingly, specific, and often 
contingent events provided all the necessary ideological premises for the Miskitu call to 
arms by threatening their culture and autonomy—the indispensible facets of their 
willingness to comply with the central government—thus prompting a non-revolutionary 
grassroots movement which aimed at assuring the ability to join the revolution on their 
own terms. Before the law, the Miskitu would no longer wait for their admittance, so 
fight they did.  
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 i 
Preface 
     I originally intended to write on the Cuban Revolution. However, I grew embittered 
to the revolution because I desired to study one that I perceived to be “just.” After 
watching ¡No Pasaran!, a documentary of the Nicaraguan Revolution, in Dr. Barbosa’s 
class, I discovered my new outlet. Dr. Barbosa convinced me that the just revolution 
occurred in my Uncle Sam’s backyard. The Nicaraguans resurrected Sandino, and 
achieved increasingly massive popular support in the two decades of their lengthy war 
against Somoza, championing the humble desires of the peasants and proletariat to create 
a nation that served, rather than oppressed, the majority of its inhabitants. They held fair 
elections to demonstrate legitimacy, and respectfully handed power over to UNO after 
losing the election of 1990. The $1.6 billion debt left by Somoza, the impoverished 
conditions characterized by the lowest literacy rate and the worst quality of life in the 
hemisphere proved no match to the determination of the masses to simply make things 
better. In no other social revolution was democracy so fervently adhered to. The new 
constitution ratified in 1987 stands beside the U.S. and Mexican constitutions as the most 
celebrated in the world.   
     I read a particularly wonderful essay by CU alum, Brian DeLay entitled Independent 
Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War, and soon after stumbled upon the story of the Miskitu 
Indians from a copy of State, Class, and Ethnicity by Carlos Vilas, in attempting to find a 
suitable research topic that specified beyond the Nicaraguan Revolution. Dr. Anderson 
always advised his aspiring historians to appreciate the agency of Indians in shaping the 
United States, a consideration becoming increasingly prominent in the field of social 
history. Dr. Anderson served as an advisor for DeLay, whose resulting essay effectively 
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portrayed the influential and distinct roles of the Commanches, Kiowas, Navajos, and 
Apaches during the U.S.-Mexican War, and evinced the existing literature’s blunt 
minimization of the Indians as non-agent proxies of the U.S. government. Rarely, if ever, 
had Indian agency in the U.S.-Mexican war even been speculated, much less 
acknowledged.  
     With DeLay’s essay as my analog, I became versed in the Miskitu narrative, and 
wondered why they would ever choose to take up arms against the admirable Nicaraguan 
vanguard, especially when the prospect of their unity appeared so profoundly beneficial. I 
found the Miskitus’ resistance to be a refreshing and inspiring success, and an exception 
to the typical indigenous story that too often ends in extinction or severe marginalization. 
I struggled to form a tenable argument, and often found myself toiling in agreement with 
the contradictory views posited by the relevant scholars. Come the end of the semester, as 
I turned in my prospectus, I overtly sympathized with the Sandinistas, and regarded the 
premises grounding Miskitu resistance as ignorant, contradictory, and ultimately 
backwards. I subsumed Miskitu consciousness entirely under the veil of ethnic 
chauvinism and found the U.S. government at fault. 
     Then, I revisited Reynaldo Reyes’s autobiography, The Unknown War by Bernard 
Nietschmann, and Resistance and Contradiction by Charles R. Hale Jr. In my preliminary 
sketches over the next few months, I became convinced of the legitimacy of the Miskitu 
cause and sought solace in defending their insightful political ambitions, which I now 
consider as anything but backwards. But what truly rooted their call to arms?  No longer 
could I reconcile categorizing Miskitu political, national, and cultural identity as 
ethnically motivated. None of the Miskitu themselves from the primary sources I used 
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ever contended their resistance to the central government as a defense of their ethnicity. 
In fact, they scoffed at such a notion. When asked about their national identity, many 
claimed to be Nicaraguan and rarely ever mentioned “Miskitu” unless the question forced 
such a response. How could their struggle be based on ethnicity when they lived 
peacefully amongst other indigenous and non-indigenous groups, including the Sumu, the 
Rama, the Creoles, and Mestizos? Perhaps more importantly, how could the distinct 
culture of the melting pot that is the Atlantic Coast be conflated to ethnicity? As 
Nietschmann points out, nobody considers the Palestinians in Israel an ethnic minority. 
Furthermore, the mestizos of the west are ethnically just as indigenous as the Miskitu, 
differing only in their miscegenation with people of lighter skin. 
     Somehow, The Trial by Franz Kafka imbued me with the sense that the Miskitu 
merely desired their admittance under the law guarded by the FSLN cadres. The Miskitu 
over and again considered themselves as Nicaraguan, but felt like outsiders in their own 
nation as the Sandinista government, whose Marxist framework lent poorly to adequate 
considerations of ethnicity, imposed an “us and them” dichotomy upon a people who 
largely embraced the revolutionary programme. As Kafka metaphorically reveals the 
plight of the German-speaking, Czech Jews of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, able neither 
to escape nor embrace their “Jewishness” under the law bureaucratically administered 
from afar, the Miskitu were similarly caught in the labyrinthine struggle of 
simultaneously defending their distinct culture and integrating into a united Nicaraguan 
nation. They could not escape being treated as an ethnic group by a government that 
perceived them as a unanimous entity void of ideological differences, when in fact, the 
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Miskitu proved every bit as ideologically heterogeneous as the citizens of the United 
States today.  
      In reconciling these considerations, I finally came to embrace the opinion that I 
defend in this paper—that the commentators on the subject inadequately analyze the 
conflict by adopting the same perspective as the Sandinistas in their initial categorizations 
of the Miskitu, a viewpoint that failed miserably and compelled the Miskitu to take up 
arms. The scholars correctly convey the important events in the wax and wane of the 
conflict but too often contradict themselves in assuming that the Miskitu constituted a 
homogenous force at the community level whose members aligned ideologically with 
their fragmented representative bodies. This oversimplification of the Miskitu does not 
sufficiently address the complexity of the localized agency that proved quite influential in 
beginning, continuing, and ending the war. I furthermore found it suitable to emphasize 
the implications of unforeseen consequences in escalating the violent struggle. For 
example, the first shot fired in the war was accidental, and led to a massive grassroots 
organization of “betrayed” Miskitu, the size and force of which astonished the Sandinista 
cadres, who theretofore rejected such mobilization as existing even in potentia. 
     The canon conveys painfully deterministic rhetoric in relaying the narrative by 
overemphasizing factors several generations removed from the young men who fought 
and died for rights the Miskitu had only recently articulated. For a year and a half I’ve 
grappled with these considerations, and somewhat reluctantly fashioned a view that finds 
itself at odds with the authorities of the subject. How could I feasibly contribute to the 
literature while never having set foot in Nicaragua, like so many of the scholars did, and 
how could I be so audacious to challenge the few tenets agreed upon throughout the 
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contentious literature? Most importantly, how could I, a young and idealistic WASP, 
construct an argument that convincingly conveys the ideology of an indigenous group 
more accurately than my predecessors? For answers to such questions, maybe you should 
ask Ward Churchill, as I can only respond speculatively. But if nothing else, if this essay 
at least more properly addresses Miskitu agency and evinces that they are every bit as 
complex and capable—indeed, as human—as any other group of people, including we 
white researchers choosing to comment from afar, my primary goals will not have gone 
in vain.   
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 1 
Introduction 
     Having gone several days without food, Rafaga and his boys marched diligently on 
towards Francia Sirpe, to prepare for what they collectively perceived as the most critical 
mission of the war. Suddenly, Rafaga spotted the peak of a mysterious mountain in the 
distance and suspected it to be the physical manifestation of an ancient Miskitu1 legend. 
He instructed his boys to amend course and head towards the mountain, prolonging their 
journey in order to ascertain the truth of his suspicion. Weary, worn, and hungry the boys 
reluctantly heeded Rafaga’s call. As the soldiers had difficulty imagining what purpose 
lay behind their leader’s seemingly delusional thoughts, they trudged onwards for more 
than a day, finding nourishment in the fertile hills of the mountain’s base, when Rafaga 
found a cave – “Come boys, I have found it! Come! Let’s go see for ourselves this 
legend.”2 By this point, the boys plainly refused. No reason could motivate Rafaga to act 
in such a bizarre way, they thought. The boys perched hastily near the foot of the 
mountain while Rafaga ventured into the small opening before him.  
    Once in the cave, Rafaga succumbed to strange and unfamiliar sensations, which he 
later described as a spiritual epiphany.  
Up until that time on the road to Francia Sirpe when I first saw Muku from afar, 
my soul had only been heated by the many battles I had witnessed. I believed God 
knew what lay ahead in my journey and that He also knew that I, like a brittle 
                                                        
1 Miskitu are also referred to as Miskito, Mosquito, etc. Miskitu also encompasses the 
plural while researchers also commonly use Miskitos.  
2 Reynaldo Reyes and J.K. Wilson, Rafaga: The Life Story of a Nicaraguan Miskito 
Comandante (Norman, OK. and London, England:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 
111. From this autobiographical account of the war by Reynaldo Reyes, I am simply 
retelling some of his most interesting life-stories, which, in a way, symbolizes the greater 
Miskitu narrative.  
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piece of iron that had only been hammered and heated, now needed to be 
tempered by His cooling spirit inside Muku Hill. This would make the leader in 
me more malleable and the soul inside of me more sensitive to great demands and 
capable of extension. By that process of annealing, I became the comandante who 
was equal to the task required by Alpha Uno.3  
This overwhelming experience profoundly altered his perspective of those he had been 
fighting against, and even of his superiors. His actions following the visit to the cave in 
Mount Muku are renowned to the inhabitants of the Atlantic Coast, as he helped organize 
the first direct peace talks between the Miskitu and the Sandinista government 
independent of United States influence.  
     Such is one of the many accounts of Reynaldo Reyes, better known by his war name, 
Rafaga—an ordinary Miskitu by birth, turned inspiration and unabated war hero to his 
boys. This tale is aimed to parallel the experience of the Miskitu Indians from 1979 to 
1987 as they struggled for autonomy and self-determination in the midst of the 
Nicaraguan Revolution. Rafaga’s story of altering allegiances through the process of 
fighting for his people’s rights is characteristic of many Miskitu and reveals the 
grassroots nature of their resistance, their shifting collective consciousness, and the 
existence of inter-ethnic division. But before the remaining details are revealed, it is 
imperative to provide context. 
     Nicaragua is the largest country in Central America and shares its borders with 
Honduras to the north and Costa Rica to the south. The Maribios, a steep mountain range, 
divide the nation into eastern and western halves, distinguishing the respective cultures as 
                                                        
3 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 118. 
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much as the climates. While the predominantly Mestizo (mixed-race) Pacific Coast 
region is more urban and modernized, comprising about 90 percent of Nicaragua’s three-
million inhabitants, the tropical Atlantic Coast, particularly abundant in natural resources, 
is more rural and underdeveloped, largely suffering the brunt of exploitation by foreign 
companies.4 This region is home to several ethnic minorities, including the Miskitu, 
Creole, Sumu, Garifuna, and Rama peoples. The 1894 Reincorporacion of Nicaragua 
subsumed the Atlantic coast region within its boundaries, creating a nation with two 
distinct histories of colonization5 that contributed to deep-seeded animosities, as the 
Spanish conquered the West and the British indirectly colonized the Atlantic Coast.  
     Since the Reincorporacion increasing numbers of Mestizos settled further East, and by 
1980, comprised about two-thirds of the region’s population of 270,000. The Miskitu are 
the largest indigenous group of the Atlantic Coast numbering about 70,000, followed by 
nearly 30,000 Creoles, and around 7,000 Sumu, Rama, and Garifuna peoples. The 
Atlantic Coast region encompasses about 60 percent of the land area of Nicaragua.6  
     Repressive authoritarian rule dominated the state in its first century as an independent 
nation. This is closely linked with the influence of economic intervention by foreign 
superpowers. The U.S. government began engaging in economic relations with Nicaragua 
around the turn of the twentieth century, while companies came in to extract lumber, 
gold, rubber, and bananas. This blatant exploitation of Nicaragua’s resources and people 
sparked enmities about neocolonial exploitation, which fomented over time. Following a 
                                                        
4 Carlos M. Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity in Nicaragua: Capitalist Modernization and 
Revolutionary Change on the Atlantic Coast, trans. Susan Norwood (Boulder, CO.: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1989), 3. 
5 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity, 5.  
6 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity, 7. 
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nearly successful resistance movement led by General Augusto Cesar Sandino in the 
early 1930s, the U.S. government formed a tight alliance with the Nicaraguan National 
Guard and placed its head, Anastasio Somoza, in charge of the nation in order to 
safeguard economic interests. Somoza and his sons, Luis and Augusto, served as despots 
from 1937 until the Sandinista takeover.   
     In 1979, after several years of struggle, leftist guerillas known as the Frente Sandinista 
de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) overthrew the U.S.-backed dictator Anastasio Somoza. 
Even though the leaders of the FSLN identified as Marxist, they accepted help from 
anybody who shared a hatred for Somoza. People of all socioeconomic and ethnic 
backgrounds, men and women, old and young alike, fought against all odds with the aim 
of creating a just society that served, rather than oppressed, the masses of Nicaragua, and 
to finally liberate their land of the imperial subjugation by the United States government. 
The vast majority of Nicaraguans supported the Sandinista takeover, affectionately 
referring to the ousting of Somoza on July 19 as “the Triumph.” 
     In general, the indigenous groups of the Atlantic Coast observed Nicaragua’s 
revolution with indifference. Though certainly repressed and subject to the economic 
exploitation of the Somoza dynasty, the Miskitu were governed by their own kings and 
faced little direct interference from the central government, and thus proved able to 
continue embracing their ancient culture. This lack of interaction with the Pacific Coast 
led to minimal indigenous support for the Revolution, despite their nearly unanimous 
resentment for Somoza.7 Though Sandinista-Miskitu relations initially proved promising, 
the Miskitu began a powerful resistance movement, forcing the Sandinistas to confront                                                         
7 Charles R. Hale Jr., Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan 
State (Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press, 1994), 13. 
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another formidable opponent aside from the U.S.-backed Contras in their attempt to 
maintain sovereignty. Heavy conflict ensued until the FSLN cadres reoriented their 
ideological stance concerning ethnic groups in late 1984, where after the two sides 
engaged in negotiations until the conflict officially ended in 1987.  
     Soon after the Triumph, the Sandinista government replaced ALRPOMISU (Alliance 
for the Progress of the Miskitu and Sumu), the indigenous rights organization of the 
Atlantic Coast, with MISURASATA (Miskitu, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista All Together). 
Led by the young and Managua-educated Miskitu, Steadman Fagoth, Brooklyn Rivera, 
and Hazel Lau, MISURASATA began negotiations with the central government 
regarding the appropriate modus operandi for integrating the impoverished Atlantic Coast 
into the Revolutionary programme. Among other notable reforms, the Sandinista 
government, in collaboration with MISURASATA, administered immensely effective 
and popular health and literacy campaigns throughout the Atlantic Coast. However, 
disagreement between the Sandinista government and MISURASATA over land rights 
sullied relations and roused the Sandinistas’ suspicions of MISURASATA’s ties to the 
U.S. government. 
     The thaw of the Cold War did not diminish the U.S. government’s anti-Communist 
sentiments, which proved especially prominent under the Reagan administration. The 
Cuban Revolution marked a formidable increase in U.S. involvement throughout Latin 
America. Having long since considered the resources of Nicaragua as a valuable 
economic interest, it is clear that some members of the U.S. government planned on 
ousting the Sandinistas from the day they secured authority. Accordingly, the U.S. 
government sought alliance with MISURASATA, supplied nearly all arms used by the 
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Miskitu, and poured millions of dollars towards assuring the demise of the Sandinista 
vanguard. The nature of U.S. government intervention and its overall influence on the 
Miskitu resistance has been subject to interpretation. 
     It is perplexing that such a poor and marginalized ethnic group as the Miskitu chose to 
rise against the Sandinistas, who so resolutely advocated the ascent of the 
underprivileged. In this paper, I will examine the factors contributing to the wax and 
wane of the Sandinista-Miskitu conflict, paying particular attention to the evolution of 
their respective perceived identities, and the extent to which U.S. government 
intervention exacerbated their ideological differences. Furthermore, I will analyze the 
roles played by MISURASATA and other indigenous organizations representing the 
Miskitu in their interactions with the Sandinista and U.S. governments, and the degree to 
which the ideologies of such organizations’ leadership actually embodied the general 
Miskitu perspective. 
     Scholars have tended towards inconsistent responses on the subject through advancing 
emphatically pro-Sandinista, anti-Sandinista, or ethnic-based lenses, largely undermining 
Miskitu agency by strictly reducing Miskitu collective action to by-products of the 
motives of intervening governments or to Miskitu perceived ethnic identity. Such 
responses perhaps reveal that the Cold War fostered an inherent capitalist versus 
communist dichotomy that has since permeated the literature, and furthermore, that many 
scholars still mistreat the agency of indigenous groups by stressing indigenous collective 
ethnic identity as the fundamental basis of their actions. Though political and ethnic 
motivations certainly played a role in escalating the Sandinista-Miskitu conflict, they do 
not alone suffice for explanation. Rather, it appears as though the combination of several 
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factors impelled the advent of a grassroots movement whose members felt obligated to 
take up arms. 
     The increasingly radical demands made by MISURASATA in their negotiations with 
the Sandinista government until 1981 led to the government’s disdain for the leadership 
of MISURASATA.8 In February 1981, the Sandinista government ordered the arrest and 
imprisonment of 42 members of MISURASATA, and in the process met confrontation 
with Miskitu at a Moravian church in Prinzapolka, leaving eight dead. This event sparked 
general Miskitu distrust for the Sandinista government, which intensified following 
Fagoth’s flight to Honduras with 2,000 Miskitu upon his release from prison. Just north 
of the border, Fagoth, the CIA, ex-Somocistas, and the Honduran National Guard 
coordinated a war funded by the U.S. government with the intent of overthrowing the 
Nicaraguan revolutionary vanguard.  
     While MISURASATA, and in particular, Steadman Fagoth, provoked the Sandinista 
government, largely under the auspices of the U.S. government, specific reactions by 
Sandinistas imbued the Miskitu with the general perception that their autonomy had been 
threatened and betrayed. Such sentiments resulted in the general Miskitu perception that 
Sandinista interaction in the Atlantic Coast constituted a project of forced assimilation, 
distinct from their desire for a process of mutual integration. This desire simply stipulated 
their entrance into the revolutionary program on their own terms primarily through 
respecting their land and its resources and cultural preservation. As a result, many 
Miskitu found it obligatory to fight in order to defend and legitimize their autonomy. 
Those in support of the resistance did not always agree with the representative indigenous 
                                                        
8 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 62. 
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organizations, some simply desired peace, and others knew relatively little about the 
reasons for fighting in general. 
     The dominant interpretations on this subject attribute the source of conflict as a nearly 
unanimous expression of ethnic militancy, largely fomented by underlying historical 
sentiments and unanimous contempt for the revolutionary government. This has led to a 
significant underestimation of the actual events leading to resistance, regarded as 
trivialities of an imminent conflict. On the contrary, in this paper, I contend that ethnic 
identity played a minimal role in escalating the Miskitu resistance, that the broader 
movement did not always align ideologically with its representative bodies throughout, 
and that the Miskitu proved more heterogeneous as a group than typically accredited. 
Accordingly, specific events provided all the necessary ideological premises for the 
Miskitu call to arms by threatening their culture and autonomy—the indispensible facets 
of their willingness to comply with the central government—thus prompting a non-
revolutionary grassroots movement which aimed at assuring the ability to join the 
revolution on their own terms. I argue that the collective Miskitu conceptions of national, 
cultural, and political identity were not veiled by ethnocentrism, as the scholarship tends 
to suggest. 
     Correspondingly, this interpretation calls into question the relevant literature’s general 
emphases on Miskitu homogeneity, alignment with its representative bodies, and 
perceived ethnic-identity as prominent features of the conflict, and adds oft overlooked 
evaluations of the dramatic roles played by individuals and contingent events in shaping 
the course of the narrative. Perhaps such considerations can contribute to a more adequate 
understanding of the interrelations of a peoples’ class, ethnic identity, and political 
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consciousness in determining their actions, the extent to which a fighting force may be 
considered representative of the people in whose name it fights, and the power of the U.S. 
government in influencing the fate of those with whom it interacts. 
     Rafaga spent several hours in the cave of Mount Muku contemplating the ancient 
etchings in the rock and remnants of the people who once occupied the space. “As I stood 
in the big room where the chairs and altar were, I began to see in my mind’s eye and to 
feel in my spirit that the ancient Indians had used the place for ritual worship.”9 His 
acceptance of the reality of the Miskitu legend, which must have survived countless 
generations, fostered a more resilient spirituality and increased faith in the old heads of 
the Atlantic Coast. Though Rafaga believed the Miskitu should continue fighting for their 
rights, he could no longer reconcile the internal disputes amongst his own people as a 
justification for violence between Miskitu, making him apprehensive of his commander, 
Steadman Fagoth. Nevertheless, Rafaga expressed enthusiasm to get to Francia Sirpe and 
begin Alpha Uno. 
     Back on the mountainside, Rafaga found his boys impatiently awaiting his return. 
They had wasted more than two days for their leader’s peculiar interest in what they 
thought was surely an ordinary mountain. Though certainly frustrated, they showed no 
antipathy towards their beloved Comandante, only excitement to re-embark to Francia 
Sirpe and begin their critical mission. Alas, Rafaga soon proved the boys’ relentless trust 
in him well warranted.  
     Rafaga and his 160 soldiers set off from Francia Sirpe for Honduras deep in the night 
of December 18, 1983 with three thousand Indians as company—Finally, Alpha Uno had 
                                                        
9 Reyes, Rafaga, 111. 
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begun. The CIA and Steadman Fagoth devised the mission, hoping that its magnitude 
would stimulate international sympathy for the Miskitu cause and garner additional aid.  
It was an incredibly great sight to see those three thousand Indians—men young 
and old, women and young girls, little children of all sizes, and babies in their 
mothers’ arms—walking together with dignity and honor, proclaiming to all the 
world that we Miskito Indians did not want any more punishment from the 
Sandinista government, that we wanted our rights to be given back to us.10  
His accountability for the direct impact on the lives of thousands of Indians for whom he 
had been fighting filled Rafaga with tremendous pride. Though the four-day journey 
proved every bit as perilous as he had anticipated, Rafaga stopped at nothing to assure 
that all in his charge traversed the border to the land where he was promised they would 
find prosperity. On December 21, the three thousand former Francia Sirpe inhabitants 
reached the protective Rio Coco, and upon crossing, became political refugees. 
     However, dissatisfaction overcame Rafaga upon witnessing the conditions of the 
refugee camps, which Fagoth had promised would provide a better quality of life. Fagoth 
expressed the desire for Rafaga to carry out an Alpha Dos, and imprisoned Rafaga after 
his refusal. Rafaga’s realization that life north of the Rio Coco was actually worse than in 
Nicaragua made him regret undertaking Alpha Uno and making false promises to his 
Indian brothers. He now knew that Fagoth cared not for the Miskitu, but for power.11 His 
disappointment upon arriving in Honduras mirrored the disappointment he and many 
other Miskitu felt upon their realization about the Sandinista shortcomings. In both 
instances many Miskitu felt betrayed and never fully forgave the culprit. Alpha Uno                                                         
10 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 122. 
11 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 128. 
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imbued Rafaga with great hope that the Sandinistas would begin actualizing Miskitu 
autonomy, only to discover that MISURASATA was just a proxy of the CIA. He then 
began working towards achieving peace. 
     The remainder of this essay is divided into the following sections: History of the 
Atlantic Coast, in which I briefly explain the demography of the Atlantic Coast and its 
history since the European incursion of the Western Hemisphere, primarily focusing on 
the Miskitu since the Reincorporacion of 1894 until the end of their resistance of the 
Sandinistas in 1987; Historiography, in which I provide analyses of the prominent 
secondary literature pertaining to the subject, and address the leading points of 
contention; Primary Source Evaluation, wherein I assess the legitimacy of the primary 
sources used for research and offer a succinct description of how they pertain to my 
overarching claim. 
      Next, I present the body of my argument, in which I defend my claim in a three-part 
chronological narrative. Part I: Blood in the Church elucidates Sandinista-Miskitu 
relations until the incident at Prinzapolka in February 1981, including reasons for their 
perceptions of betrayal and the contributions of possible underlying historical factors to 
the haste with which mutual resentment intensified. Part II: Big Heads and Big Lies 
focuses on MISURASATA between the emergence of war and the Sandinista 
government’s ideological reorientation of 1984. I speculate about the levels of Miskitu 
support for the war and their general perceptions of the Sandinistas while tracing the 
clandestine operations of the U.S. government and the Miskitu recognizance of its 
economically based ulterior motives. Returning Home with Written Rights chronicles the 
resumption of dialogue between the Sandinistas and Miskitu in 1984, including analyses 
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of the various indigenous rights organizations in their attempts to match the influence of 
the original MISURASATA, until the ratification of the Nicaraguan Constitution in 1987. 
Correspondingly, I consider the terms under which the Miskitu laid down arms, while 
indicating their potentially significant relations to the causes for resistance, and whether 
or not the war ultimately enhanced Miskitu autonomy. 
     In the Conclusion, I link the central tenets of each section of my argument stressing 
the influence of contingencies and individuals in shaping the Miskitu narrative. I then 
consider limitations to my argument and the areas in need of further study. Finally, I 
point to the larger significance of understanding the Sandinista-Miskitu conflict, and 
make suggestions for further research.  
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History of the Atlantic Coast: 
     The Miskitu are the largest of various ethnic minorities sparsely populating the 
Atlantic Coast of Central America, from Honduras to Costa Rica. The vast majority of 
the Miskitu reside in Nicaragua along the Rio Coco River, from Cape Gracias a Dios in 
the North to Pearl Lagoon in the South. Since time immemorial, the Miskitu have 
successfully resisted hegemonic dominion from Spanish-speaking colonizers, and along 
the way, formed strategic alliances with English-speaking Imperial forces.  
     By the seventeenth century, English colonizers settling from Jamaica landed ashore 
the Atlantic Coast with African slaves. Economic relations ensued, while the Miskitu 
traded resources such as lumber and pine oil for various commodities of the international 
market. The introduction of African-descendants led to miscegenation, and the two 
groups effectively dominated the land at the expense of dwindling populations of Sumu, 
Rama, and Garifuna peoples. The English used a method of indirect colonization over the 
coast, and allowed the Miskitu and Creoles to choose their kings and maintain their 
traditional culture and way of life. “The Miskitos, and later on the Creoles, assumed 
themselves to be subjects of the British, opposed to any attempt to unite with the Spanish 
colony in the Pacific and, after independence, with Nicaragua.”12 The Miskitu willingly 
allowed British colonization, and contrary to the Spanish method of direct colonization, 
this alliance with the English enabled the Miskitu to continue embracing their ancient 
culture.                                                          
12 Charles R. Hale Jr. and Edmund T. Gordon, “Costeno Demography: Historical and 
Contemporary Demography of Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast” in Ethnic Groups and the 
Nation State: The Case of the Atlantic Coast in Nicaragua. (Stockholm, Sweden: 
CIDCA, 1987), 12-32. 
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     In 1848, two Moravian missionaries arrived in Puerto Cabezas after having little 
success in finding converts in Jamaica. Moravianism proved well accepted by the 
Miskitu, and the Moravian church soon became the most powerful institution of the 
region. In the course of less than two generations, the Moravian Church became the main 
form of expression of the ethnic identity of the Coast’s people, both Indians and 
Creoles.”13 The church prioritized education and increased literacy rates throughout the 
Coast, teaching in English and the native tongues. Furthermore, the Moravian Church 
adopted a staunch anti-Nicaraguan stance, more than likely in response to the nation's 
catholic bent. Thus, the Missionaries supported Miskitu autonomy largely out of fear of 
interference by the Nicaraguan government. The Miskitu, as a result, developed stronger 
animosities towards the Pacific Coast and a sense of national identity, which identified as 
British more than Nicaraguan.14 This re-emphasized and strengthened the Miskitos' 
desire to remain separate from the Nicaraguan central government.  
     By the 1860s, the United State government developed an interest in the Atlantic Coast 
due to its abundant natural resources, and began attempting to replace British influence 
over the area. After successfully waning British economic ties with the Miskitu, the 
British, Spanish, and American governments officially declared the Atlantic Coast the 
legal entity of the Miskitu in 1862, and named the region the Mosquito Reserve. The 
British government felt that by granting the Miskitu legal autonomy, the two could 
continue their economic ties in the face of U.S. Intervention.  
                                                        
13 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity, 33. 
14 All of the relevant sources comment on this, but Hale’s opinion most succinctly 
describes the general contention amongst the literature. For example, he states they 
displayed a preference for Anglo-hegemony over a Spanish one. Hale, Resistance and 
Contradiction, 56.  
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     The Spanish, British, and U.S. Governments continued jockeying for control over the 
region until 1894, when Juan Zelaya, the head of the Nicaraguan government, “by means 
of a small military operation... occupied the city and port of Bluefield, removed the 
authorities of the Mosquito Reserve, declared the sovereignty of Nicaragua over the 
region, and raised the Nicaraguan flag.”15 British involvement with the region abruptly 
ceased. Without British support, the Miskitu lacked the means to prevent nominal 
annexation, but they unanimously reprehended it. Less than a month after the 
Reincorporacion, hundreds of Miskitu gathered in Puerto Cabezas and wrote a letter to 
Queen Elizabeth expressing their disapproval of the “Spaniard's” encroachment, declared 
their support for the British Crown, and pleaded for assistance in recognizing Miskitu 
autonomy. No response came and the Mosquitia Reserve remained officially subsumed 
under the nation of Nicaragua.  
     The introduction of North American enclave economies drastically shifted the 
socioeconomic structure of the Atlantic Coast, and over the next half-century, created an 
ethnic based hierarchy wherein the Miskitu lay subservient to the Creoles and Mestizos. 
Foreign companies instituted a period of wage-labor, which forced the largely uneducated 
and unskilled Miskitu into physically demanding occupations, such as work at the mines. 
Furthermore, the Creoles came to dominate church authority while the increasing 
numbers of Mestizos took the skilled labor positions. The Miskitu were not alone in 
suffering the brunt of neocolonialist exploitation, and stood similarly to the vast majority 
of Nicaraguans to the west, with the addition of ethnic undertones. 
                                                        
15 Vilas, State Class and Ethnicity, 12. 
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       A popular rebellion led by General Augusto Cesar Sandino and his rag-tag assembly 
of guerrillas known as the “mean little army,” who sought to put an end to the unjust 
oppression suffered by the masses for Yankee benefit defined the 1920s and 1930s. 
Fearing the potential strength of this rebellion, the central government called the United 
States Marine Force in for help. Sandino's execution in 1934 temporarily marked the end 
of his movement, but widespread unrest thereafter permeated the social consciousness. 
After quelling the notable resistance, the Marines crowned the head of the Nicaraguan 
National Guard, Anastasio Somoza-Debayle sovereign. Miskitu support for Sandino's 
Rebellion mirrored their ambivalence in the Revolution to come. So long as interactions 
with the west remained minimal, the Miskitu were content. Furthermore, the Miskitu 
tended to sympathize with the U.S., and largely supported their motives over those of the 
central government.16  
      Beyond sharing English as a vernacular, U.S. Economic intervention utilized the 
same modus operandi of indirect rule as the British, and provided much appreciated 
commodities to the Coast integrating them into the international market. Furthermore, 
most of the Moravian Missionaries were American and steadfastly evangelized Miskitu 
autonomy as achievable only through avoiding inclusion with the West. Somoza and the 
U.S. profited enormously through collaboratively exploiting Mosquitia land and labor. 
The Miskitu largely met the indirect method implemented by the U.S. And Nicaraguan 
governments with compliance, and the region soon experienced a powerful period of 
economic boom.  
                                                        
16 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 100.  
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     Overexploitation led to a severe recession on the Coast in the 1960s. The poor 
economic conditions and advent of international organizations concerned with indigenous 
rights led to the creation of ALPROMISU as a representative body for indigenous groups 
of he Atlantic Coast. The leaders of ALPROMISU were primarily Miskitu pastors and 
aimed to legitimize Costeno determination over their region and curb developmental 
progress.17 Somoza permitted ALPROMISU's organization but provided no legal power. 
However, ALPROMISU and the Moravian Church collaborated to improve Costeno 
education—a process through which the Miskitu learned of their inalienable rights and 
long history of “Spanish” resistance. This intensified Miskitu perceptions of ethnic-
identity.  The Somoza Regime used the Nicaraguan National Guard to keep a close eye 
on ALPROMISU. Fear of denouncing Somoza fostered ALPROMISU's ambivalent 
support of him and the FSLN's popularizing revolution. 
     Though some Miskitu headed west to support the Sandinista cause, the lack of 
guerrilla forces throughout the Coast distanced the Miskitu from the Revolution. The 
Triumph of 1979 amounted to minimal Miskitu celebration. They assumed the new 
government would be no different from its predecessor. However, Somoza's ousting 
hastily altered daily life in the Mosquitia by causing an immediate exodus of the foreign 
companies. The FSLN's economic expropriations proved less successful throughout the 
Coast as a result of its deep and longstanding underdevelopment. This left many on the 
Coast jobless, without access to the American commodities they depended upon, and 
                                                        
17 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity, 87. 
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nostalgic for the economic conditions in the presence of foreign capital.18 Moreover, the 
Sandinista government continued dissolving all the “Somocista” institutions, including 
ALPROMISU. Upon strong Miskitu insistence for its replacement, the government 
reluctantly allowed the creation of MISURASATA, so long as its leadership consisted of 
Managua-educated Miskitu.19  
     Following MISURASATA's inception, it collaborated with the central government 
and quickly enacted widely popular and effective health and literacy campaigns and 
reorganized the economy. Crippling economic sanctions administered by the U.S. 
Government on the socialist state impeded its ability to realize economic progress on the 
Coast, leaving it largely underdeveloped to this day. The fair negotiations between the 
FSLN and MISURASATA and variety of improvements of the Coast legitimized Miskitu 
conceptions of regional autonomy20, which intensified over the first two years of their 
interactions with the central government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
18 This is an argument largely embraced by Vilas and Hale, but described succinctly in 
Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 100-102, wherein he posits definitions for “Anglo-
affinities” and “ethnic-militancy.”  
19 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 96. 
20 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 97. 
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Historiography      
     In this section, I group the relevant literature into three broad categories based on 
perceived similarities in the arguments about the reasons for the Sandinista-Miskitu 
conflict. As I pointed out in the introduction, objective interpretations of the conflict are 
few and far between, a fact which appears closely linked to the capitalist versus 
communist dichotomy instilled by the Cold War. The three groups are referred to as pro-
Sandinista, anti-Sandinista, and ethnicity-based. While each group has contributed 
meaningfully to the literature, the interpretations advanced by the pro-Sandinista and 
ethnicity-based camps tend to garner more acclaim and popularity in the canon than the 
anti-Sandinista stance. While a tenable anti-Sandinista interpretation seems possible, its 
advocates to date have articulated positions based far more on personal opinion than the 
historical events, though such sentiments arguably coalesce more succinctly with Miskitu 
feelings. These groups are not entirely exclusive and some overlap is apparent between 
the pro and anti-Sandinista camps with the ethnicity-based interpretations. Some 
contemporary publications have adopted more objective interpretations, albeit through far 
more specified scopes.  
     The pro-Sandinista approach is characterized by stressing MISURASATA ethnic 
chauvinism and susceptibility to U.S. government manipulation as the primary causes 
contributing to the outbreak of war. Furthermore, this stance emphasizes U.S., Contra, 
and MISURASATA human rights abuses against the Miskitu to force them to fight and 
defends the Sandinista vanguard’s responses to the ‘Indian Question’ as just and 
remarkably progressive in relation to other nation’s attempts at dealing with indigenous 
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minorities.21 The pro-Sandinistas tend to regard the Miskitu as a ‘sleeping giant’ yet 
without the ability to undergo revolutionary transformation due to their backward 
consciousness and underdeveloped, over-exploited land.22 The most notable advocates of 
this position include Carlos Vilas and Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz. 
     Bernard Nietschmann and William Meara represent the anti-Sandinista group. Their 
interpretations affiliate most notably through holding that the Miskitu constitute their 
own nation, one separate from and far older than the neo-colonial state to the west. They 
commonly stress Sandinista interactions with the Coast as an illegal and unanimously 
resented incursion, aimed at annexing the independent nation for economic interests. This 
stance is fused with powerful anti-communist rhetoric and treats U.S. intervention as a 
valiant liberation of the marginalized, while dismissing the Sandinistas as assimilationist, 
if not genocidal miscreants, inherently evil by nature of their political ideology.23 
Nietschmann and Meara cite alleged Sandinista human rights abuses, Miskitu political, 
not ethnic identity, and the economic decline of the Coast after the triumph as evidence.24   
     The marked differences in the overarching claims made by the members of the 
ethnicity-based interpretation admittedly render its reference as somewhat of a misnomer, 
but it is designated as such in order to highlight the scholars’ common attempt to 
adequately explicate Miskitu ideological reasons for bearing arms, aside from their 
perceptions of Miskitu merit. Perhaps the only theme common to the arguments advanced                                                         
21 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas: Human Rights and Self-
Determination (New York City, NY.: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 243. 
22 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity, 20. 
23 Bernard Neitschmann, The Unknown War: The Miskito Nation, Nicaragua, and the 
United States (Lanham, MD., Freedom House, 1989), 2-4. 
24 For example, see Neitschmann, The Unknown War, 34-5, and William R. Meara, 
Contra Cross: Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989 (Annapolis, MD., 
Naval Institute Press, 2006), 98-9. 
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by Charles R. Hale Jr., Glenn T. Morris and Ward Churchill, and Eric Meinger is their 
insistence on Miskitu agency as a powerful entity in shaping the events of the narrative. 
Each also alludes to Miskitu grassroots organization as influential to the outbreak of their 
violent resistance, and moreover characteristic to eventual Miskitu distrust of the 
Sandinistas and U.S. intervention, and the ensuing return to peace.  
     Charles Hale contributes perhaps the most comprehensive addition to the literature 
with his Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State, 1894-
1987, in which he explicates the evolution of Miskitu collective consciousness since the 
Reincorporacion, and its influence in sparking violent resistance. Hale, an American 
anthropologist who did research for CIDCA in the 1980s, while living on the Atlantic 
Coast for two years, includes compelling Miskitu voices in his narrative, and ultimately 
displays admirable sympathy for both the Miskitu and Sandinistas in retelling the 
conflict. Hale ultimately contends that the combination of deeply rooted Miskitu 
sentiments, which he terms “Anglo-affinities” and “ethnic militancy” constitute the key 
factors in understanding the emergence and continuation of Miskitu collective action.25 
     Furthermore, he stipulates that both the Miskitu and Sandinistas expressed a mutually 
hostile “contradictory consciousness” which furthermore fomented tension and ultimately 
prolonged the conflict. This contradictory consciousness is characterized by the 
Sandinistas and Miskitu as both being “cultures of resistance, imbued with premises that 
limited their liberating potential and brought them squarely into conflict.”26 He also 
contends that the Miskitu showed far more excitement for the Triumph than typically 
held. Government policies and the structural conditions within the Coast economy after                                                         
25 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 81.  
26 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 161. 
 22 
1979 heightened intra-ethnic tensions while grassroots organizing certainly encouraged 
collective action. In Hale’s view, they suddenly had an opportunity for “the good fight”. 
     While Hale does an extraordinary job of explaining the important events in great 
depth, limitations arise from his treatment of them and the conclusions he draws from 
such detailed analyses appear suspect. For example, rather than pointing to the events, 
such as the Sandinistas’ arrest of the leaders of MISURASATA, as crucial in escalating 
conflict, he treats them as trivialities in a relationship destined for failure based entirely 
off of the Miskitu history and their contemporaneous ethnic-identity. This ethno-centric 
approach implicitly assumes that MISURASATA, even with its own internal divisions, 
was fully representative of the larger Miskitu populace. In my argument to come, I will 
expound greatly upon this limitation, with support from my primary sources. 
Furthermore, Hale did the vast majority of his work in Sandy Bay Sirpi, and concludes 
that Miskitu sentiments there hold throughout the entire Coast, a somewhat hasty 
generalization largely dismissed by my primary sources. For example, Hale 
acknowledges that the inhabitants of Sandy Bay Sirpi proved especially anti-Sandinista 
largely due to their proximity to Fagoth’s operative in Honduras and firm insistence of 
the old heads to support the war. 
     Vilas does an excellent job of explaining the economic conditions of the Coast 
between the Reincorporacion and Sandinista-Miskitu conflict, but his Marxist approach 
treats Miskitu collective action deterministically, and his argument is overall 
contradictory by claiming the Miskitu are only a product of their socio-economic 
standing while simultaneously stipulating their ethno-centrism, which he claims evolved 
outside of their economic situation, accounts as the primary factor leading to their 
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resistance.27 By arguing that the Miskitu were yet unable to account as agents of history, 
he maintains that they were unable to join the revolutionary program. Accordingly, he 
contends that the Sandinistas overlooked this fact and proved limited in their ability to 
adequately address the “Indian Question” through subsuming class, ethnicity, and 
political ideology under one category, whereas, for the Miskitu, each was distinct and 
created a contradictory consciousness necessitating armed resistance.28 This approach is 
slightly too sympathetic to the Sandinistas, and views the Miskitu in the same way as the 
Sandinistas viewed them—backwards.  
     Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz provides the best analysis of potential heterogeneity amongst 
the Miskitu by claiming that they tended to be Pro-Sandinista, and that those who fought 
were coerced by the contras, the U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary forces operating in 
Honduras. However, this is also the primary setback to her argument. By arguing that the 
Miskitu were simply a reluctant proxy of the U.S. counterrevolutionary campaign, she 
actually assumes that they constituted a homogenous, pro-Sandinista body forced to 
resistance out of fear. This view undermines Miskitu agency through failing to 
differentiate Miskitu resistance from Contra resistance, and by claiming that the U.S. 
government and, in particular, the Reagan administration, were solely responsible for the 
conflict. This view furthermore treats the Sandinista government as entirely guiltless, 
albeit with some convincing evidence. Nevertheless, her interpretation is weakened by 
her lack of acknowledgement for legitimate Miskitu animosity for the revolutionary 
government. Dunbar-Ortiz does not acknowledge the grassroots composition of Miskitu 
                                                        
27 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity, 100.  
28 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity, 101.  
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resistance, instead arguing that the increasingly radical demands made by 
MISURASATA sullied relations and came as a result of U.S. government intervention.29  
     Morris and Churchill take an interesting stance that perhaps most adequately 
acknowledges Miskitu agency in the conflict. They achieve this through explicating 
Sandinista shortcomings in dealing with the Miskitu, particularly emphasizing 
Sandinista-Miskitu disagreement about land rights. They ultimately argue that the 
Miskitu fought the Sandinistas out of cultural and political, not ethnic, differences, which 
they felt necessary to defend, and that this defense was an entirely just struggle against a 
neocolonial threat. Accordingly, their argument can be simplified in the following 
terms—just as Nicaragua popularly and justly resisted the imperialist force that is the 
United States government, the Miskitu, similarly resisted the imperialist force of the 
Nicaraguan government.30 Furthermore, the essay primarily concerns the manipulative 
role played by the U.S. government, which arguably supported a just cause, but for the 
wrong reasons.31 This view points out the Miskitu agency and grassroots composition in 
the resistance as evinced by their popular refusal to allow further U.S. support, and carry 
on a war without a legitimate representative body after the dissolution of 
MISURASATA. This interpretation, however, is weakened by its prima facie support for 
indigenous resistance through contending that any and all Miskitu demands were justified 
simply because of their indigenous nature.                                                          
29 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 250.  
30 In an interview I conducted with Ward Churchill over phone in early March, he 
explained and briefly summarized the argument he and Glenn T. Morris made in the 
essay they published in 1987.   
31 Ward Churchill and Glenn T. Morris, Between a Rock and a Hard Place – “Left-Wing 
Revolution, Right-Wing Reaction and the Destruction of Indigenous People” in Cultural 
Survival Quarterly, Issue: 11.3, Fall 1987, “Militarization and Indigenous Peoples: Part 1 
The Americas and the Pacific. 
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     Dunbar-Ortiz’s analysis of the radical demands made by MISURASATA evinces the 
problematic nature of Morris and Churchill’s argument. For example, the Miskitu 
demanded full control of over 56% of Nicaraguan territory in Plan ‘81, at the exclusion 
of the vast majority of its inhabitants, which included Mestizos, Creoles, Sumus, and 
Ramas. In other words, as Dunbar-Ortiz notes, the Miskitu made demands that had no 
chance of being approved by the Sandinistas, in order to foment tension, which appears to 
have been coordinated under the auspices of the U.S. government.32 
     Nietschmann argues that the Miskitu constituted a separate nation, which has been 
under attack for half a millennium. This nation, he contends, had every right to defend 
against annexation by Communists, and that they likely would have had no chances of 
success without help from the U.S. government. This view is quite similar to the one 
posited by Churchill and Morris, except that it is far more supportive of U.S. intervention, 
and while admitting to their ulterior motives, argues that they were far less injurious than 
the motives of Nicaragua’s “Stalinist regime”.  
     CIDCA is a Nicaraguan institution that specializes in social science research on the 
Atlantic Coast, which compiled findings of several of its members in Ethnic Groups and 
the Nation State. This source includes articles by Hale and Vilas, which account as their 
preliminary endeavors leading to their more comprehensive publications to come. Galio 
Gurdian, Hans Peter Buvollen, Andrew Gray, and Pierre Fruhling provide analyses of 
specific topics of concern pertinent to the Coast in the midst of its violent resistance to 
the Sandinista government, and emphasize the importance of the Miskitu history in 
determining their course of collective action, and revolutionary states’ troubles with 
                                                        
32 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 250-2.  
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properly treating ethnic minorities. Members of CIDCA spent significant time on the 
Coast, and, without their findings, much of the later contributions to the literature would 
likely prove far more speculative in nature.  
     Through studying this, one can learn a lot about the typical progression of social 
revolutions and the vanguards’ repressive reflexes to dissent, in this case plagued by the 
cadres’ incremental oversimplification of its “counterrevolutionary” enemies. 
Additionally, one may understand to a greater extent the extraordinary difficulty most 
revolutions have in maintaining the popular support of ethnic minorities, that the 
combination of Miskitu collective identity and the Sandinistas’ mounting anxiety towards 
resistance showed an oversimplification of the Miskitu people as a unanimously 
expressive resistance movement. Perhaps the Sandinistas’ dealings with the Coast 
demonstrate an apparent limitation in most Marxist structural approaches in tending to 
reduce all types of collective identity to socio-economic terms, prima facie disregarding 
ethnicity as an ontological entity. Ultimately, the points of contention amongst the canon 
elucidate its yet inadequate ethnic-categorization that oversimplifies a complex cultural 
identity. This underestimation has likely stemmed from the similar mentality adopted by 
the Cadres and soldiers of the FSLN in their collective predetermination of Costeno 
identity regarding their roles in the revolution.  
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Primary Source Evaluation 
     The primary sources utilized for research may be grouped into two broad categories: i) 
Miskitu sources and ii) media sources. Most of the Miskitu primary sources are 
transcribed interviews published in compilations aside from the guidelines stipulated by 
indigenous organizations and Reynaldo Reyes’s autobiography. I have utilized or read 
through various media sources pertaining to the subject, such as newspaper articles, the 
film ¡No Pasaran!, an autobiographical piece by Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz,  and an 
interview I conducted with Ward Churchill. Though not all such sources were able to 
contribute to my overarching argument, and are thus not utilized in this essay, ¡No 
Pasaran! and Dunbar-Ortiz’s memoir facilitated various avenues for study during the 
beginning of my research and are thus at least worth brief mention. 
     Alvin Levi carried out several interviews with Miskitu and Creole peoples of the 
Atlantic Coast and compiled them in Nicaragua, the People Speak. This provides direct 
interviews with fifteen costenos during the summer of 1984, which marks the most 
intense period of conflict between the Sandinistas and Miskitu. The interviews took place 
largely in Puerto Cabezas, Bluefields, Corn Island, and Sumobila, which respectively 
constitute the largest cities in the northern and southern regions, a small town in between, 
and a resettlement campaign in the region’s interior. Miskitu embrace differing views of 
the central government within each community, ranging from loyal support to bitter 
resentment. However, nearly every interviewee contends that he or she desires peace, 
identifies as Nicaraguan, and perceives MISURA, the Contras, and U.S. government 
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support with disdain.33 Interviewees varied in gender, ethnicity, and age, ranging from 
early twenties to seventy. The vast majority of the interviewees claimed to support the 
central government and feared the Contras more than the Sandinistas. They tend to 
express the hope for the US government to stop funding the indigenous organizations 
because then, they contend, a return to peace will ensue and the villages can return to 
revolutionary redevelopment. 
     These interviews provide a trustworthy glimpse into the daily lives of several Miskitu, 
who each offer unique perceptions while largely displaying particular appreciation for the 
Sandinista health and literacy campaigns and the Moravian Church.34 In addition, many 
comment about the improved safety and increased involvement in the communities. 
Furthermore, those who dissent to the central government do so largely out of economic 
considerations primarily relating to food or job shortages.35 From such sources one may 
glean an appreciation of the range of political perceptions regarding the government and 
the war, while also evincing some commonalities cherished by all. However, it is possible 
that Levie tailored the sources he published based on a political motive, perhaps trying to                                                         
33 Alan Levie, Nicaragua: The People Speak (South Hadley, MA., Bergin & Garvey 
Publishers, Inc., 1985), 137-77.  
34 For example, from Levie, The People Speak, 142-43: in an interview he conducted 
with a peasant woman of twenty-four from Puerto Cabezas, Nubia speaks fondly of the 
literacy campaign and pledges support for the Sandinista government, and 149-50: an 
interview with a middle-aged male shopkeeper who claims that the Contras kidnapped his 
son and forced him to fight against the Sandinistas.  
35 For example, in Levie, The People Speak, 157-9: documents a public procession held 
at the Court to replace a Sandinista CDS coordinator for the village who left briefly on 
vacation. Levie attended the meeting and recorded some of the quotes showing the 
differences in political ideology held by the Miskitu: While a male in his twenties revels 
in fear of the Sandinistas and claims they took away his job and are trying to exterminate 
the Miskitu, a younger woman responds that such information is all a big lie constructed 
by Fagoth and the Contras. Overall, the meeting went fairly well without much dissent 
though, and soon after a man was designated as the temporary CDS coordinator of the 
village.  
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show that support for the central government existed amongst the Miskitu. Charles Hale 
attests that the Miskitu frequently responded to interviews conducted by perceived 
foreigners deceitfully, as if to mock the interviewers, or would simply respond with the 
answer they thought that the interviewer might want. It must also be taken into 
consideration when evaluating these sources that many Miskitu feared unwarranted 
imprisonment by the central government, so it may not be too implausible to suspect 
them displaying different views publicly than they held privately. 
     I use these sources often and find them to be largely trustworthy. I find this to be the 
case based on the great fear many of the Miskitu demonstrated for the Contras. Many 
parents interviewed had sons captured by MISURA and forced into battle. Whether or not 
their broad support of the Sandinista government might be suspect, Miskitu never once in 
these interviews acknowledged ethnic distinction from other costenos. Furthermore, I 
find that the articulations made by the Miskitu to be legitimate because Levy often 
recounted his public interactions with Miskitu, who did not shy away from arguing about 
their political perceptions. These sources are all useful in my overarching argument, 
which contends that ethnic militancy did not exist at the community level, supported by 
their general desire for the war to end, and that the Miskitu communities proved quite 
heterogeneous. 
     In his autobiography, entitled Rafaga, Reynaldo Reyes also provides meaningful 
insights about the fragmentation of the Miskitu leadership, Miskitu reasons for taking up 
arms against the Sandinista government, the inalienable rights of costenos, and displaying 
contradictory views with the leadership of MISURA and KISAN. Though Reyes clearly 
exaggerates many of his stories, his memory of the events align with reality, and 
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secondary sources often comment on his participation with the central government in 
negotiations for peace.36  
     Reyes is unique to the Miskitu because he was lucky enough to receive university 
level education, could have obtained a high position in the church but instead decided to 
support the revolutionary government and uphold posts designated by them,37 such as 
serving as a National Defense Committee (CDN) member.  He is one of the few Miskitu 
who fought as a guerrilla for both the FSLN and MISURA, and then participated in the 
negotiations for peace. In that sense, he displays the general trend of the Miskitu in 
originally supporting the government, turned to fear and resentment and culminated in 
support once again.  
     In providing by far the most in-depth personal Miskitu narrative and his active 
involvement with several community leaders, I use several of Reyes’s anecdotes as 
representative in some way to the broader Miskitu populace based on the period. Beyond 
this, I make use of Rafaga’s passionate defenses of the revolutionary ideal, of wanting to 
see the Atlantic Coast united with the Sandinista government, and his contention that the 
Miskitu fought to reclaim the rights that the Sandinistas originally granted them.38 
Furthermore, his fervent distrust and dislike of Fagoth is analyzed in different contexts, 
and helps to show that many fought for the Miskitu best interests and resented Fagoth, 
                                                        
36 For example, Hale references Reynaldo Reyes in Resistance and Contradiction, 173, 
claiming that he was a field commander who chose to negotiate with the Sandinistas, 
indicating that the low chances of winning the war contributed to their decisions to 
engage in dialogue with the central government.  
37 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 10. 
38 For example, in Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 56, Reyes claims “I believe it is my 
obligation to fight with my brothers for our Indian rights.”  
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but still fought for him because he provided the most viable, if not only outlet for armed 
resistance.  
     The New York Times and Managua-based Envio are two periodicals that provide 
several different articles about the Atlantic Coast. The New York Times articles published 
frequently include interviews with Brooklyn Rivera, chief of MISURASATA’s 
reincarnate, and chronicling the resumption of dialogue between MISURASATA and the 
Sandinista government as told either by Rivera or Tomas Borge.39 Contemporaneous 
articles published by Envio similarly focus on the relations between the Sandinista 
government and the indigenous organizations, evaluating the merit of allegations against 
the Sandinistas of human rights abuses, and the conditions of the resettlement camps of 
Tasba Pri.40 Both agencies tend to mythicize their increasingly hostile perceptions, 
mirroring their divergent understandings of domino-theory politics. Ultimately, Envio 
and New York Times articles contextualize the prevalent themes inherent to the 
dichotomous conceptual differences supra et ultra the respective leaders of Nicaragua, 
the Miskitu, and the U.S. Accordingly, the sensitivity of the subject amongst its 
participants inflated.   
     Envio often provides leftist analyses of the actions of the Sandinista government. Its 
articles tend to support Sandinista ideological motives.41 Contrarily, the New York Times 
                                                        
39 For example, Neil A. Lewis, “Miskito Rebels Say They Want a Truce,” New York 
Times, September 25, 1987; Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times 
(1851-2009), with Index (1851-1992), A3.  
40 For instance, a brief description of some of the Miskitus’ decision to engage in peace 
talks is provided in “Who’s Political Football are they, Miskitu fighting amongst 
themselves,” Envio Vol. 5, No. 59, (May, 1986): 1-27. 
41 See “The Politics of Human Rights Reporting on Nicaragua” in Envio vol. 5 no. 60 
(June 1986), 14-29 in its evaluation of the detrimental incursion of the U.S. government, 
while seeking to disprove nearly all foreign allegations with certainty. 
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articles often embellish Sandinista “abuses,” clearly partial to the Miskitu cause. The 
differing conceptions of Rivera and his motives from these articles portray a significant 
disparity between the polarizing interpretations of the revolution, which fomented with 
U.S. intervention.42 These sources are both used to bolster the existence of fragmentation 
amongst the Miskitu leadership and Rivera’s non-revolutionary aspirations. Envio’s 
legitimacy is limited by its inseparable biases from political affiliation while the New 
York Times articles occasionally misinterpret analyses of the Sandinista government’s 
abuses of human rights largely tendency to view the Sandinista government’s actions 
from the increasingly suspicious lens of the international community.  
      Ohland and Schneider provide another meaningful compilation of published 
documents by the Sandinista and Miskito leadership. This includes the documents 
presenting the rights of MISURASATA until 1982. I use this compilation of sources to 
highlight the increasingly radical changes in MISURASATA’s demands to the central 
government. Furthermore, this source contains a letter written by Fagoth in 1979 to the 
central government43 and some writings by Brooklyn Rivera. I utilize these sources to 
                                                        
42 Refer to the tonal disparity between an American indigenous advocate Glenn T. Morris 
in his description of Miskitu collective resistance as “the foremost struggle for indigenous 
sovereignty in the world” transcribed from: Stephen Kinzer, “U.S. Indians Enlist in the 
Miskito Cause,” New York Times, (November 11, 1985); ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009) with Index (1851-1998): A3., and 
“Reagan & Co. Mine the Road to Peace,” Envio vol. 7 no. 79 (January 1988): 2-16., in 
asserting that the Sandinista cadres are “trying to make very clear... that no matter how 
difficult the situation becomes or how much pressure is brought to bear against the 
country, Nicaragua’s desire for peace will not be manipulated.”  
43 Steadman Fagoth, interview about the interests of indigenous communities, entitled 
“Unity and Fraternity between MISURASATA and FSLN,” El Nuevo Diario, reprinted 
in Klaudine Ohland and Robin Schneider in National Revolution and Indigenous Identity: 
The Conflict between Sandinists and Miskito Indians on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast 
(Copenhagen, Denmark: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, November, 
1983), 73-9.  
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evince the fragmentation amongst the Miskitu leadership. These sources are largely only 
useful in Part I and Part II because Ohland and Schneider published the compiled 
documents in 1982. A piece by Norman Campbell published under MISURASATA 
entitled We are not against the revolution! and Rivera’s response We are part of this 
revolution! are from March and April 1981, soon after the Sandinistas’ imprisonment of 
MISURASATA members and helps evince my claim that Fagoth played a decisive role 
in escalating conflict. 
     The Nicaragua Reader provides many meaningful sources, especially pertaining to the 
Sandinistas’ ideological reorientation of 1984 and analyses of the Atlantic Coast during 
the war and the resettlement camps. For example, Inside a Miskitu Resettlement Camp by 
Katherine Yih evinces the satisfactory conditions of the asentamientos through her 
interviews with Miskitu at Tasba Pri, leading her to contend that life in the camps 
actually increased Miskitu support for the Sandinistas.44 This source calls into question 
Bernard Nietschmann’s claim that the asentamientos were no different than concentration 
camps in Nazi Germany. However, many commentators opposed to the Sandinista 
government assert that they always made sure that the camps appeared suitable before 
allowing spectators. Nevertheless, the Miskitu interviewees appear honest in their 
answers. For example, they support the Sandinista decision to move them for their safety, 
but simply express the tremendous aspiration to return home, while blaming the Contras 
for the unsettlement. Furthermore, this source invokes the perceptive political awareness 
demonstrated by the Miskitu during the war, a sentiment used in arguing against Vilas’s 
                                                        
44 For example, see Katherine Yih, “Inside a Miskitu Resettlement Camp,” in The 
Nicaragua Reader: Documents of a Revolution under Fire, by Peter Rosset and John 
Vandermeer (New York City, NY.: Grove Press, Inc., 1983), 90-4.  
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claim that the Miskitu only displayed ethnic consciousness while lacking the capacity to 
develop a political consciousness.  
     While I use other primary sources, the aforementioned are the most prominent and, 
together prove representative of the opinions articulated by interviewed Miskitu. Overall, 
there are not many Miskitu primary sources available because there are no published 
commentaries of the war written by Miskitu. Even Reyes’s autobiography was pieced 
together through recordings. The reason for the lack of Miskitu primary sources is that 
they prefer to tell history through oration rather than writing. Nevertheless, the available 
sources are sufficient in supporting my overarching argument based on the existent 
commonalities in their perceptions. For example, though they articulate different political 
ideologies, they never mention ethnicity as a motivating factor in fighting, nor often even 
the land. Furthermore, the Miskitu interviewees all identified as Nicaraguan and wanted 
the war to end. 
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Part I: Blood in the Church 
     “Before the Law” is a Kafkaesque parable, and tells of a man seeking entrance to the 
law through a guarded doorway. He waits the entirety of his life for admittance, which is 
never granted. Just before dying, the man asks why no one else has attempted access, 
even though everyone seeks the law. The doorkeeper responds, “no one else could ever 
be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to shut it.”45 
Seeking entrance to the law is an endemic theme to the Miskitu consciousness in the 
years after the Triumph, but instead of merely waiting for admittance, they fought for it. 
     Reyes’s decision to fight against the Sandinistas came from the confines of a cell, 
wherein denial of his access to legal rights catalyzed noncompliance. He waited 
desperately for a heavy night rain, ideal cover from pursuing authorities, should he 
successfully escape his confines. Rain finally came late on December 19, 1981, exactly 
one month after his imprisonment. His presumed guilt to the Sandinista authorities—that 
being Miskitu proved his compliance with Fagoth—led to a defiant resignation of his 
support for the Sandinistas. Late in the night, when most of the guards were out on the 
town, Reyes made a desperate plea for water, and feigned deathly ill upon the guard’s 
response. Reyes asked to be taken to the courtyard so as to douse himself in cold water. 
The guard permitted, and just after making it outside, Reyes caught the unsuspecting 
guard with a swift chop to the throat. He grabbed the guard’s gun and beat him with it 
and then ran unidentified to the nearby pier.46  
                                                        
45 Franz Kafka, The Trial, trans. Edwin and Willa Muir (London, England: Vintage 
Classics, 1999), 201. 
46 Recomposed from Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 67-72. 
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     A swift barrage of bullets compelled him to swim nearly a mile to a more discrete 
location, where he eventually found solace in the house of a devout Moravian woman, 
who, with the help of the Miskitu community, concealed his whereabouts from the 
pursuing Sandinista authorities. He was able to spend a couple of nights with his children 
and told them that he must fight for his rights against the Sandinistas. Even though he 
resented Fagoth, Reyes headed to the bush, desiring only his legitimate admittance and 
protection under the inalienable laws conceived by the Sandinista cadres.47  The 
government’s nominal enactment of its progressive legal strictures taught Reyes his 
rights, while in practice, excluded him from them, leaving him with no viable options but 
to join MISURA’s resistance, albeit with opposing, non-revolutionary aims. 
     Reyes fought for the Sandinistas as a guerrilla on Nicaragua’s western front during the 
revolution, held government designated posts upon returning to the Coast, and 
demonstrated a firm adherence to the revolutionary ideals even after resorting to the bush. 
Even so, being Miskitu rendered him as a suspicious outsider to the Mestizo guards, and 
his attempts at garnering their trust proved futile. Rafaga’s unjust treatment echoes that 
felt by many Miskitos who had interacted with Fagoth or MISURASATA at all in the 
past, as the Sandinista government ostracized leading Miskitu from the Revolution based 
on their ethnicity, which catalyzed tragic consequences. The Miskitu were scared of the 
revolution. They did not want to topple it, but in trying to prove their commitment, many 
were still imprisoned unjustly.  
     Accordingly, in this section, I relay the relevant events between the Triumph and the 
massacre at the Prinzapolka church and contend that the MISURASATA and the 
                                                        
47 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 173. 
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Sandinista government implicitly instilled the Miskitu with an entirely new ethnic 
identity, enabled through the collaborative creationist history imparted by Coastal reform 
policies, and in particular, the literacy campaign. The Miskitu could only meaningfully 
engage with the suspicious Sandinista government by assuming this imposed ethnic 
identity, which sparked a grassroots defense of Costeno culture in the face of perceived 
assimilations policies. This defense furthermore proved distinct from MISURASATA’s 
objectives. The thrust of this argument is encapsulated in the existence of Miskitu 
resentment for Steadman Fagoth, coupled with the Sandinistas’ increasingly erratic fear 
of general Miskitu support for him. Such fears triggered unwarranted over-reactions by 
the Sandinista authorities, while the Miskitu, who thus far maintained a deep commitment 
to the revolution, felt unable to escape its marginalizing tendencies. Ultimately, 
Sandinista perceptions of Miskitu ethnic-identity as necessarily at the core of their 
increasing distrust of the central government has been traditionally accepted by the 
literature, when in fact, it appears virtually non-existent to the general Miskitu psyche.  
     The primary factors influencing this grassroots organization and turn from quiescence 
to resistance are closely linked with the literacy campaign, the incremental demands 
made by MISURASATA, and the Sandinista government’s responses to their suspicions 
of the organization and its leadership. Compelling Miskitu descriptions of the decision to 
bear arms bolsters my claim about the nature of relations between the Sandinista 
government and MISURASATA.  
 
The Birth of MISURASATA    
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     The government authorized MISURASATA as the new indigenous organization for 
the Atlantic Coast, albeit with some reluctance, in Novermber 1979, only months after 
assuming control of the State. While many of ALPROMISU’s leadership joined 
MISURASATA, young and educated Miskitu were placed in charge by the FSLN. These 
leaders, most notably Steadman Fagoth, Brooklyn Rivera, Hazel Lau, and Armstrong 
Wiggins assumed far more political responsibility in dealing with the government than 
their predecessors of ALPROMISU, though it is apparent that the FSLN originally 
anticipated MISURASATA to be a cultural and social as opposed to political entity.48 
Nevertheless, the FSLN received MISURASATA’s first statement of principles and 
demands with gracious respect. Over time, it became apparent that MISURASATA’s 
leadership used ethnocentric rhetoric to conceal individual political motives. 
     MISURASATA issued their initial statement in the summer of 1980, and echoed 
ALPROMISU in asking for educational reform, with particular emphasis in assuring that 
it be conducted in the native languages of Miskitu and English49. Within weeks, the 
central government initiated its Coastal literacy campaign and furthermore provided 
MISURASATA a seat in the council of state, the FSLN’s legislative national body50, thus 
granting its admittance before the law—under the representation of MISURASATA’s 
president, Steadman Fagoth. The government “accepted in principle indigenous 
                                                        
48 Hale, Charles, Resistance and Contradiction, 100. 
49 For example, the document MISURASTA: General Directions states “The Sandinist 
State must guarantee our indigenous peoples their right to exist, to live in accordance 
with our customs and to develop our cultures, since they constitute specific ethnic 
entities—that is to say, the right to maintain and develop our cultures, languages and 
traditions. We do not want to imitate foreign forms, but to be as we are. Therefore, we 
strive that our Sandinist country be a truly multi-ethnic state.” Included in the 
compilation by Ohland and Schneider, National Revolution and Indigenous Identity, 52. 
50 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 239. 
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ownership of traditional villages and communal lands, and awaited a study and proposal 
from MISURASATA on which to base the confirmation of this principle.”51 In addition 
to educational reform, the government instituted various other programs throughout the 
coast, providing improved medical care, transportation, and technology.” 
MISURASATA’s increasingly radical demands in its ensuing proposals to the central 
government hastily deteriorated relations, and ultimately imbued Costeno Indians with a 
distinct conception of “us versus them” with regards to the West and their imposition of 
authority. 
     Popular mutual support for the revolutionary government and MISURASATA 
prevailed throughout the communities of the Coast. Not only did the Miskitu demonstrate 
a firm commitment to the Revolutionary programme, but also they proved willing to 
endure the economic hardships brought by the region’s redevelopment due to the 
improved health-care, education, and communal collaboration.52 Nubia Mora, a Miskitu 
woman of twenty-four at the time of the Revolution was a secretary in Puerto Cabezas 
who spoke fondly of the years after the triumph.  
Before, many women became pregnant. Often, the man just walked away. Now 
the government forces him to pay for the children. Before, for women, there was 
nothing. Now every girl goes to school. If she shows promise and the desire, she 
is encouraged to continue her education. There is no limit to what a woman can 
do now.53   
                                                        
51 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 240. 
52 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 240. 
53 Levie, The People Speak, 141. 
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This improvement to communal organizational and functional capacities increased with 
popular participation in the community and allowed women to fulfill their traditionally 
designated role of nurturing the community.54 Furthermore, the prior existence of 
prostitution, theft, and racism that plagued many Miskitu communities abruptly ceased 
following the Triumph, as the Sandinista Defense Committee members (CDNs) improved 
the sense of justice in the community.55 The women could effectively care for their 
children and participate progressively with regards to the community, with sufficient 
resources to not be compelled to prostitution. Nearly no research has been conducted on 
the potential differences in opinion between men and women in supporting the struggle.  
     Furthermore, the Miskitu recognized MISURASATA as the vehicle through which the 
progressive reforms were enabled. Miskitu mutual support for the Sandinista government 
and MISURASATA, evinced by grassroots cooperation with the brigadistas56, Moravian 
Church authorities, and community leaders ultimately surfaced a distinct Miskitu cultural 
and historical identity characterized as Nicaraguan and Moravian before Miskitu. This 
shift in social consciousness evolved in opposition to the increasingly ethnocentric views 
advanced by MISURASATA’s leadership, and enabled their capacity for mass 
                                                        
54 For example, Dunbar-Ortiz makes a similar claim to this by reference to the 
matriarchal composition of Miskitu society in Indians of the Americas, 241 and 256. 
55 For example, in an interview conducted by Alan Levie, Clifford Blanford, a middle-
aged Creole man married to a Miskitu woman claims “Lydia, my wife, and me talk about 
this a lot. We both have the same ideas about things. We both support the government. 
Take crime. Now there are very few thieves. Before the revolution—oh, boy!” and soon 
after states “Then there was discrimination here. Since the Triumph we seem to mix 
better. We have more of a Christian brotherhood now. I like that,” Levie, The People 
Speak, 144. This evinces the improved safety of the communities brought with the 
Revolution and furthermore, shows unification around the Church more than ethnic 
identity.  
56 Brigadista is the term used by the Sandinistas and Miskitu to refer to the teachers of the 
Literacy Campaign. 
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organization in defense of the revolutionary ideals. Though the Miskitu acknowledged 
MISURASATA as its representative body, it merely functioned in their eyes as the policy 
designer, their enactment resided locally, within the communities. In most Miskitu 
villages, community authority resided with the local leaders of the Moravian Church.57 
Thus, communal progress developed Miskitu conceptions of the Revolution locally rather 
than through MISURASATA, inciting varying conceptions of the revolution.  
     Generally, the secondary sources stipulate the Miskitu desire for gaining access to the 
law is characterized by their resistance to allow political and legal marginalization based 
on ethnicity. As a result, the community leaders coalesced a grassroots mobilization in 
order to force the central government to rescind its fearful abandonment of progressive 
legal rights, which guaranteed fair trial. The differing ideologies espoused by community 
members’ pertaining to politics did not deter the nearly unanimous demand for inclusion 
into the Nicaraguan revolutionary program. Such considerations suggest that the 
leadership of MISURASATA provided the means for resistance enabling community 
organization, albeit through contrary motives. If true, Miskitu agency ought to be 
reinterpreted by inclusion of local composition to the relevant discourse at the expense of 
viewing the Miskitu communities as similarly counterrevolutionary.  
 
The Literacy Campaign 
     The government spent liberally in funding the literacy campaign that began in October 
1979, which sent teachers, built schools, and taught countless Miskitu to read and write in 
                                                        
57 Vilas and Hale comment on this composition most comprehensively. Vilas notes the 
role of the church as the authority in State, Class, and Ethnicity, 33, and Hale does, too in 
Resistance and Contradiction, 48-51.  
 42 
their vernacular. In just over a year, the Coastal Literacy Campaign more than quadrupled 
the region’s literacy rates, which hovered around ten percent before the Triumph58, 
mirroring the success achieved by the FSLN’s educational reform out west. In much the 
same fashion as the Cuban revolutionary vanguard’s alfabetizacion two decades prior, 
Nicaraguan literacy campaigns focused on instilling a revolutionary consciousness 
through cultivating “the New Man,” which translated to “the New Indian” on the Atlantic 
Coast. The brigadistas collaborated with the local authorities in instituting educational 
reform, teaching the Miskitu of their inalienable rights and their collective history.  
     In teaching Miskitu history, the brigadistas59 emphasized the Miskitos’ inherent 
commonalities with General Sandino, the martyr in whose name the masses of the west 
fought and won their revolution. This imbued the Miskitu with a social consciousness 
characterized by their everlasting resistance to colonial subjugation, and the rights 
they’ve successfully protected since time immemorial. A Miskitu adult from a small 
village on the coast of the Rio Grande contended: 
MISURASATA sent teachers from the Rio Coco; it was really wonderful.  
Our brigadista was named Pablo. He taught us about how things were first time; 
we had no idea before. He taught us that Indians have many rights, our own 
territory, the right to self-government and to live in harmony with one another. At 
the same time, they sent people to measure our land.60  
                                                        
58 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity, 8.  
59 Educated Sandinista and Miskitu youth largely served as the brigadistas. Initially, the 
brigadistas were predominantly Mestizos from the west, but over time increasingly 
became young Miskitu. 
60 An adult community member who lived in Sandy Bay Sirpi, as quoted by Charles R. 
Hale Jr., Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State 
(Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 79. 
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With nostalgia for “the good old days,” the Miskitu determinedly sought to manifest their 
perceived destiny. Hale concisely describes the broad contention that this glorification of 
the past linked inextricably with the formation of Miskitu ethnic identity. This appears 
true, but for peculiar reasons. 
     The joint enactment of educational reform by MISURASATA and FSLN vanguard 
colluded in “westernizing61” Miskito political consciousness, which necessitated the 
conceptualization of an ethnic-identity to participate politically with the government and 
constructed a New Indian fluent in the contemporaneous political discourse of ethnic 
minorities in revolutionary states. Over time, MISURASATA selected the brigadistas, 
often Miskitu no older than twenty, and directed them to emphasize ethnocentric rhetoric 
and a creationist history as a means to enhance its political legitimacy on the Coast over 
the central government.62 Historian Eric Meringer asserts that in order to “promote this 
new ideology and further advance their ethnic agenda, MISURASATA leaders 
proclaimed themselves stewards of Miskito history announcing ‘coherence and continuity 
of [the Miskito’s] historic memory’ as an essential element in their mobilization and 
                                                        
61 Referring to the Western European political model and ideal. Hale and Vilas both 
comment on this evolution of Miskitu political consciousness. However, whereas Vilas 
denies the Miskitu capacity to yet become politically conscious due to their lack of 
experiencing the exploitation of capitalism long enough, Hale contends that the Miskitu 
actually demonstrated keen political awareness. Respectively from Vilas, State, Class, 
and Ethnicity in Nicaragua, 126, in his description of indigenism as politics, and Hale in 
Resistance and Contradiction, 96, in his description of the effects of the literacy 
campaign.  
62 Eric Rodrigo Meringer. “The Local Politics of Indigenous Self-Representation: 
Intraethnic Political Division Among Nicaragua’s Miskito People during the Sandinista 
Era.” Oral History Review 37, no. 1 (2010): 1-17. Furthermore, MISURASATA publicly 
advocated for its right to teach its own version of history. Vilas also acknowledges the 
MISURASATA’s desire to “create” their own history in State, Class, and Ethnicity, 122.   
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construction of a new society.”63 Accordingly, the literacy campaign cultivated a Coastal 
ethnic revival out of a distinctly ethnic-based conception of history, which increased in 
proportion with MISURASATA’s demands. This incremental process of ethno-genesis is 
linked closely to the political aims of MISURASATA’s president, who took drastic 
measures to secure authority in the face of the organization’s longstanding intra-ethnic 
divisions.64 
     Miskitu community members responded divisively to MISURASATA’s gradual turn 
to ethnic-chauvinism. Distrust for Fagoth existed within MISURASATA and Miskitu 
villages and ultimately split the Miskitu in their attempts of reconciling the seemingly 
contradictory conceptions of Miskitu identity and the revolutionary ideals. The 
implications of this inter-ethnic division require further explication of MISURASATA’s 
relations with the central government following the turn of the revolutionary decade. 
Such explications will help in understanding the relations between the government’s 
conceptions of the Coastal Indians and the Miskitu collective response.  
 
MISURASATA’s Increasing Demands   
     Though traces of ethnocentrism appeared in MISURASATA’s General Lines of 1980, 
they did not suggest separatist motives, and the Sandinistas met the strictures with 
approval. However, MISURASATA’s Plan for Action of January 1981 demonstrated a 
radical departure from its original demands through the inclusion of indigenist rhetoric 
                                                        
63 Meringer, The Local Politics of Indigenous Representation, 12. 
64 The political aspirations of Brooklyn Rivera and Hazel Lau became increasingly at 
odds with Fagoth’s radicalizing motives. For example, see Meringer’s transcription of an 
interview with Hazel Lau in The Local Politics of Indigenous Self-Representation.  
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that stressed inalienable Coastal rights as an aboriginal nation.65 Accordingly, what began 
as negotiations towards regional solidarity with the Nicaraguan state turned into 
MISURASATA’s conception of the Atlantic Coast as the “Moskitia,” an independent 
nation, separate from and far older than Nicaragua. This ideological transformation was 
developed through their creationist history that hyperbolized resistance to the “Spanish.” 
The evolution of MISURASATA’s demands resulted in the FSLN’s roused suspicions of 
the Miskitu as a proxy of intensifying U.S. government counterrevolutionary 
intervention, which culminated in the Sandininista vanguard’s costly response in 
February 1981.  
     The Sandinistas particularly disputed the land demarcation of Plan ‘81, which 
demanded MISURASATA’s sole control of 30 percent of Nicaragua’s territory at the 
exclusion of any oversight by the larger state.66 The FSLN cadres pointed to the vast 
disparity between these demands and the ones originally advanced by MISURASATA 
and refused to grant the organization control over a territory in which the Miskitu 
constituted nowhere near half of the population. The government responded by 
investigating the leadership of MISURASATA only to discover that Fagoth previously 
stinted as an informant for Somoza’s Secret Police (from a letter) and that advisers 
                                                        
65 For example, see Ohland and Schneider note in a commentary that the emphasis on 
cultural defense in the General Guidelines switched to announcing “an ‘intensive 
consciousness-raising campaign’ and possible ‘massive demonstrations’ in order to push 
through the land claims” and demands the creation of several Misurasata, like Juventud 
MISURASATA and Mujeres de MISURASATA to replace the organizations supplied by 
the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas perceived these demands as separatist, from National 
Revolution and Indigenous Identity, 22.  
 
66 The specifics of these demands are included in Dunbar-Ortiz’s Indians of the Americas, 
238, and Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 139. 
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connected with the counterrevolutionary opposition prepared and financed the land 
demarcation to be presented following the consummation of the literacy campaign. 
     During the conclusion of the Coastal literacy campaign in February 1981, the 
government arrested 43 MISURASATA members and activists, including Fagoth, 
alleging their involvement with ex-Somoza and CIA covert operations.67 In the process, 
Sandinista officials barged into the Moravian Church of Prinzapolka and interrupted its 
session to detain Ariel Zuniga, a MISURASATA literacy worker, and Fagoth’s brother in 
law. Eight men died in the ensuing scuffle while news of the event spread rapidly 
throughout the Coast. The marked uncertainty of exactly what transpired in the 
Prinzapolka Church on the 18th of February resulting in the deaths of four Miskitu and 
four Sandinistas. The diametrically opposed conjectures adopted by the Sandinista 
government and the Miskitu about what happened during the religious ceremony 
rendered imminent the violent clash to come.68  
    The Sandinista soldiers’ intrusion of the Moravian Church while the Miskitu 
celebrated the success of the literacy campaign and disrespecting the church authorities, 
who agreed to talk with the Sandinistas as soon as they finished the religious ceremony, 
constituted perhaps the most offensive and assimilationist actions to the Miskitu. 
Furthermore, that blood was shed as a result during the most sacred of rituals, no matter 
                                                        
67 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 241. 
68 While the Sandinistas claim the Miskitu incited the conflict by stealing a soldiers’ gun, 
the Miskitu tend to argue that the Sandinista officials are to blame. For example, refer to 
Meringer, The Local Politics of Indigenous Self Representation, 10, in an interview 
conducted by Meringer with an anonymous Miskitu who was in the church and witnessed 
the scuffle. The interviewee provides an incredibly detailed description of the event and 
contends the Sandinista soldiers outside of the church began firing after they heard the 
initial gunshot. He states that three Miskitu in the church had effectively taken the guns 
from the Sandinista soldiers inside the church and fired back. 
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who fired the first shot, it imbued many Indians with the perception that the Sandinistas 
did not value Miskitu culture. Reyes stated,  
I believe that it is really very important for all to know exactly how the real… war 
began that day in Pizapolka… The government was trying to defuse Fagoth’s idea 
of bringing a war against the Sandinistas. By removing our leaders, the 
government believed that the idea would die. But the government’s action had an 
opposite effect on the Indian people. They had been pushed too far and were 
ready for war.69 
No matter how fervently the Miskitu supported the Revolutionary government, it would 
never be able to supersede their loyalty to their brothers and to the Moravian Church. 
This is why the Miskitu remained so adamant in protecting their cultural customs.  
     The government quickly released most imprisoned, and authorized Fagoth’s discharge 
about a month later on the condition that he attend school in Europe. Fagoth promised he 
would go to Denmark so long as he could visit for one last time his ailing mother. 
However, after seeing his family, Fagoth rounded up more than 2,500 Miskitu around the 
Rio Coco and led them into Honduras, thereafter leading an auxiliary branch of the 
hardly covert U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary operation, while the young Miskitu men 
in his company received combatant training.  
     The Sandinistas conceived of all Miskitu as ideologically united with Fagoth, though 
most Miskitu had no direct interaction with MISURASATA and knew little of its 
incremental demands. Reyes claims that soon after the tragedy at Prinzapolka,  
                                                        
69 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 42. 
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While in my quarters at the Sandinista jefetura command post, a group of my 
Sandinista companeros arrested me and took me to the Tronquera jail. The 
government believed that all Miskito Indians were participating with 
MISURASATA. Because I was Miskito they had begun to mistrust me, and for 
that they put me in jail.70 
In characterizing all Miskitu as counterrevolutionary, even those most loyal to the 
revolution, who worked for the government, the Sandinistas imposed an ethnic identity 
upon the Miskitu by abruptly recanting the just protection under the law that originally 
gained the Sandinistas so much support. Though this treatment varied from mere 
suspicion to unwarranted arrests and imprisonments, the Miskitu united out of fear and 
wondered whether the government planned all along to use repressive tactics in order to 
force the Miskitu in assimilating to Mestizo culture. Ultimately, this shows that the 
Miskitu came to bear arms for entirely different reasons than the ones stipulated by 
MISURASATA’s leadership, which made no secret about its alliance with the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN)71.  
     Although MISURASATA certainly emphasized a creationist history that focused on 
ethnocentrism, imbuing the Miskitu with a new collective consciousness, their 
conceptions of ethnicity appear minimal at most in their decision to take up arms. From 
the beginning, those who decided to resist the revolutionary vanguard aimed not for its 
overthrow, but rather to re-secure the rights upon which the Sandinistas infringed. It is 
clear that not all Miskitu supported counter-revolutionary resistance, or resistance of any 
                                                        
70 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 47. 
71 This was the name of the Counterrevolutionary representative organization backed by 
the United States. 
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kind for that matter. Many still continued to have faith in the government. For example, a 
Miskitu man claimed, “I support this government… they’re trying hard. You can’t fault 
them for that. Of course, they make mistakes, too. If you’re human, you make mistakes. 
Isn’t that so?”72 But enough Miskitu had fled to Honduras with Fagoth, and viewed 
resistance as the only option. Fagoth provided an outlet for action, which they followed. 
However, even most who supported the war also still identified as Nicaraguan.73 
      The Miskitu identification as Nicaraguan supports the notion that they also fought to 
defend their culture. While Bernard Nietschmann addresses the sources of conflict as a 
defense of culture from an assimilationist and totalitarian regime74, and protection of an 
aboriginal nation distinct from Nicaragua, Glenn Morris and Ward Churchill contend 
similarly albeit through a far weaker claim that the Sandinistas accidentally prodded the 
Miskitu into justifiably viewing the revolution as assimilationist, and fought not out of 
ethnocentrism but to protect their distinct culture.75 Yet, both assume the Miskitu as 
constituting a unanimous anti-Sandinista group, and neglect to distinguish between the 
motives for resistance at the community level and within MISURASATA’s leadership. 
Awareness of the existence of varying levels of support for the Sandinista government                                                         
72 Alvin Levie, Nicaragua the People Speak. 145. 
73 For example, Rivera and Reyes both continued to identify as Nicaraguan. They simply 
desired their inclusion under the state’s guarantees again. 
74 Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 30.  
75 Churchill and Morris, Between a Rock and a Hard Place, this article is presented on 
the website for Colorado’s American Indian Movement, 
http://coloradoaim.org/history/NicaraguaRockandhardplaceanalysis.html, but first 
appeared in Cultural Survival, vol. II, No. 3 (Fall 1987).  Churchill, Morris, and 
Nietschmann advocate a view known as Fourth World Indigenism, which contends that 
indigenous groups are entitled to absolute sovereignty over their land, which they may 
claim under any and all circumstances and in accordance with international law must 
immediately receive all demands from the national sovereign body. However, this 
viewpoint is difficult to defend due to the fact that the Miskitu constituted a minority 
group in the land they wanted full control over, at the exclusion of all other ethnic groups.  
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and the broad reluctance within the communities to beginning a movement that would 
inevitably turn bloody is critical in understanding the conditions leading to war.  
 
Conclusion 
     In sum, many of the imprisoned Miskitu were completely innocent and had no ties, or 
even awareness, of MISURASATA’s covert relations with counter-revolutionary forces, 
and actually continued to support of the Revolution. Nevertheless, their unjust relegation 
to an ethnic minority held with increasing suspicion by members of the Sandinista 
government left a car that would not soon be forgotten. While several thousand Miskitu 
received military training under the CIA and remnants of Somoza’s national guard north 
of the Rio Coco, many more fled to Honduras and constituted a powerful contingent 
willing to respond to the Sandinista betrayal violently. 
     This calls into question the widely held assumptions in the relevant scholarship that 
the war began from an intense ethnic-militancy grounded in deeply rooted aspects of 
Miskitu history and characterized by continual resistance to the “Spanish,” and that the 
vast majority of Miskitu ideologically aligned with Fagoth.76 Rather, the revolution 
educated the Miskitu, enabled them politically and communally, and by and large made 
an agreement with the Miskitu guaranteeing their fair treatment under the law in return 
for adherence to the revolutionary ideals. However, the Sandinistas alienated its popular 
contingent of support throughout the Coast by over-reacting, as the government turned 
from a liberating force to a repressive one. This eventually forced the Miskitu to broadly 
                                                        
76 For example, refer to both Hale and Vilas. Hale builds off of Vilas’s argument and 
coins the terms “ethnic militancy” and “Anglo-affinities.” Vilas, State, Class, and 
Ethnicity, 105-7, and Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 100.  
 51 
support MISURASATA, which remained as the single political authority still worth 
trusting.  
     Ultimately, the positions adopted by Hale and Vilas assume the same characterization 
of the Miskitu as adopted by the Sandinista government following their roused 
suspicions, and treat the Miskitu as an ideologically homogenous ethnic group fully 
aligned with MISURASATA. However, the available Miskitu voices reveal evidence to 
the contrary. Whether or not Miskitu individuals continued to support the government, 
proponents for both sides acknowledge the existence of a brewing war with sufficient 
numbers and legitimate political premises. Failing to comment on the existence of 
Miskitu heterogeneity further weakens the claim that ethnic-militancy grounded the 
resistance by undervaluing localized Miskitu agency and moreover incorrectly supposes 
the firm grip of a leader who was not even in the same country.  
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Part II: Big Heads and Big Lies 
     Trapped by a troop of Sandinista soldiers in the thick of the jungle, Reyes clutched his 
22.-caliber tightly, hoping its 18 bullets would be enough to save his surrounded boys 
with empty guns. “I began firing that… long hunting rifle like it was a machine gun. I 
had to do that to save my boys because the Sandinistas were going to kill us. When it was 
over, there were eleven soldiers dead right in front of us and I had not used the last 
[bullet].”77 “Rafaga,” one shouted, “our savior!” This is how, in early 1982, Reyes 
received his nombre de guerra, which means ‘gust of wind’. The boys collectively raised 
their drained arms to heaven. 
     Deep in the jungle, right outside of some town in northeastern Nicaragua, is where 
most of the battles between the Sandinistas and Miskitu took place. The poorly armed 
Miskitu held God close as they fought for their rights. This, one of Rafaga’s first clashes 
with the Sandinistas, in early 1982, left him with a heavy heart. He did not think of 
himself as a killer, but violence offered the only viable hope for re-securing autonomy in 
the minds of many Miskitu.78 Starting in December 1981, a few thousand Miskitu men 
carried out missions, from a CIA operative in southern Honduras, against Sandinista 
forces occupying various Miskitu villages. Many of these men fled to Honduras at 
Fagoth’s request, others were forced.  
     In this section, I show the fragmentation between Miskitu. After mid-1982, most 
Miskitu in Nicaragua tended to side with the new Costa Rica based MISURASATA, but 
enough were already fighting for Fagoth’s Honduras based MISURA that the Miskitu 
were essentially fighting two separate wars. Scholars have only vaguely commented on                                                         
77 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 61. 
78 Reconstructed from Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 58-64.  
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the effects of this split at the community level79. The MISURA branch served as a leg for 
the Contras, yet many fighting for MISURA, like Rafaga, fought for very different aims 
than its leader, Fagoth. It appears as though the Northern towns tended to support 
MISURA, while the communities farther south sympathized more with the Sandinistas 
and sided with MISURASATA.  
     This period is characterized by the beginning of U.S. government public intervention 
and the central government’s attempts to defend the revolution. During this period, the 
Miskitu recognized Fagoth’s betrayal in fighting a war for the U.S. government, which 
clearly did not have Miskitu best interests in mind, and responded varyingly to the 
ensuing split of MISURASATA, which resulted in a two-front Miskitu war. Resentment 
of the government increased following the Sandinistas’ resettlement campaign. However, 
the Miskitu had to choose between supporting two distinct representative organizations to 
address their differing sentiments. This period marks the height of the conflict, which did 
not wane until the National Elections of 1984, after which negotiations for peace began. 
Ultimately, I contend that the split between the Miskitu leadership also existed at the 
community level, and that Miskitu ethnic-identity played a minimal factor in their 
decision to support the government, MISURA, or MISURASATA. Instead, many were 
coerced into battle by the Sandinista government and MISURA, while those remaining in 
their villages tended to align with MISURASATA based on the mutual desire to return to 
peace. 
                                                         
79 Only Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 245-6 hints at the existence of Sandinista-
Miskitus, but makes the controversial and unfounded claim that most Miskitu supported 
the Sandinistas and most who fought against the central government were coerced into 
fighting. 
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Responses to the Massacre at Prinzapolka 
     Soon after the incident at Prinzapolka, Miskitu began making bows and arrows, with 
which to confront Sandinistas in the area. Furthermore, nearly 5,000 had fled to Honduras 
and received military training from the remnants of Somoza’s National Guard. However, 
violent conflict between the Miskitu and Sandinistas did not appear until the U.S. 
government began its public intervention in Nicaragua, marking the creation of the 
Contras and sending aid and arms to the Miskitu.80 The war began on 21 December 1981 
with Operation Red Christmas, during which Miskitu guerrillas from Honduras invaded 
the Rio Coco and brutally tortured and murdered at least 60 people associated with the 
Sandinista government81. The arrival of U.S. aid undoubtedly enabled the Miskitu to 
carry this mission out, and the Sandinistas responded in an unpopular manner again. To 
the Sandinista perspective, this event effectively marked the beginning of the Contra 
War.   
      Though the Sandinistas dissolved MISURASATA, Fagoth created a new organization 
with most of the same members, known as MISURA. He dropped the SATA from the 
name because it is the part of the acronym that refers to the Sandinistas.82 Though many 
Miskitu did not have counterrevolutionary motives, Fagoth certainly aimed to overthrow 
the central government, and Operation Red Christmas made these powerful separatist 
motives clear to the Sandinistas, which proved increasingly viable with its newfound U.S. 
government support. Fagoth’s alignment with the U.S. government, CIA, and ex-                                                        
80 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 250. 
81 Charles R. Hale Jr, “Institutional Struggle, Conflict and Reconciliation: Miskitu 
Indians and the Nicaraguan State (1979-1985)” in Ethnic Groups and the Nation State:  
The Case of the Atlantic Coast in Nicaragua (Stockholm, Sweden: by CIDCA, 1987), 
101-128. 
82 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 153. 
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Somocistas did not bode well with the majority of MISURA’s leadership, and led to 
irreconcilable fragmentation within the organization. 
 
Resettlement Campaign 
     The Sandinista government responded to Operation Red Christmas by militarily 
evacuating the Rio Coco area in January 1982, whose inhabitants could either cross the 
border into Honduras or move inland to asentamientos, or resettlement communities. The 
government viewed the action as necessary to protect the inhabitants of the new war 
zone, due to Fagoth’s obvious ties with the U.S.-backed counterrevolution and its 
potentially strong base among the Miskitu83. Most of all, the Sandinistas feared that the 
Coast would become the center of counterrevolutionary operations, wherein the U.S. 
government could form operative bases. The Sandinistas destroyed many of the villages 
in order to prevent this from happening.84 Half of the 20,000 Miskitu inhabitants of the 
Rio Coco region, mostly the young men, left for Honduras, while the other 10,000 were 
relocated to the camps of Tasba Pri85. This move temporarily eliminated the remaining 
Miskitu who sympathized with the Sandinista government in northeastern Nicaragua, 
while Reagan and Fagoth used this “forcible relocation” to garner international sympathy 
for the counterrevolutionary cause by charging the move as an example of human rights                                                         
83 Hale, “Institutional Struggle, Conflict, and Reconciliation,” 122. Also noted in an 
article by Gabriel Bell, et al., “There was not too much resistance during the relocation” 
printed in Klaudine Ohland and Robin Schneider, National Revolution and Indigenous 
Identity: The Conflict between Sandinists and Miskito Indians on Nicaragua’s Atlantic 
Coast (Copenhagen, Denmark: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1983), 
269-84. In this interview, FSLN members talked about the relocation and contend that the 
Miskitu primarily showed gratefulness in their ensuing improved safety.  
84 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity in Nicaragua, 154. 
85 Tasba Pri was the largest of the resettlement camps. In the Miskitu language, Tasba Pri 
means “Free Land.” 
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violations by the Sandinista government, and likening Tasba Pri to the Nazi’s genocidal 
concentration camps.86 
     The quality of life in the camps has been widely acknowledged by human rights 
observers as adequate if not better than the standard in the traditional villages. Katherine 
Yih claims, “improvement in the quality of life in Tasba Pri has not only been economic; 
popular participation in the administration of the communities has increased as well,” and 
furthermore notes that over time “the Miskitu people’s attitude has shifted palpably from 
resentment to satisfaction with improving conditions, and a growing trust of the 
Sandinistas.”87 However, many Miskitu grew embittered to the Sandinistas for taking 
them from their homes, which they loved. One woman in Sumobila, a resettlement 
village, claimed “I don’t want to die in the mountains. I want to die on the Rio Coco. We 
don’t have the right food here. It’s bad. In my village we have fish, rice. We had 
pineapple and coconut. We had everything on the Rio Coco.”88 Nevertheless, another 
woman who simultaneously participated in Levie’s interview stated that she still supports 
the Sandinista government, and claims that the contras constitute the real problem.89 This 
                                                        
86 Dunbar-Ortiz comments extensively on the allegations of human rights abuses 
committed by the Sandinistas and proves that the vast majority of allegations did not 
occur. Furthermore, in a speech by U.S. President Ronald Reagan, he refers to the 
Miskitu as “Freedom Fighters” and claims that they in serious danger of extermination at 
the hands of the communist Sandinistas: Reagan, Ronald, “Let me Set the Record 
Straight on Nicaragua,” from The Nicaragua Reader: Documents of a Revolution Under 
Fire, edited by Peter Rosset and John Vandermeer (New York City, NY.:, Grove Press, 
Inc., 1983), 14-17. 
87 Katherine Yih, “Documents of a Revolution Under Fire” from The Nicaragua Reader: 
Documents of a Revolution Under Fire, edited by Peter Rosset and John Vandermeer 
(New York City, NY.: 1983), 90-94. 
88 Levie, The People Speak, 165. 
89 Levie, The People Speak, 165. 
 57 
evinces the heterogeneity that characterized the Miskitu during this period at the 
community level. 
     From all of the Miskitu interviews about living in the camps of Tasba Pri, they never 
once mention their ethnic-identity as a reason for resenting the government, and tend to 
sympathize with the Sandinistas. Furthermore, they blame the resettlement on the Contras 
and MISURA. Their main problems with resettlement are linked to their desire to return 
to living as they did before, in their own hometowns where they were born and had lived 
their entire lives. Some express the fear of having to remain in the camps forever, but 
claim that as soon as their brethren drop their arms, they will be able to return home. The 
following quote by a Miskitu man living in Sumobila is perhaps most representative of 
the Miskitu opinion: “There are some here who are afraid to speak out because you’ll 
think that they’re against everything—against the government. We are not against. We 
only want to live as we did before.”90 This overwhelming desire for peace is especially 
prominent amongst the inhabitants of the Tasba Pri settlements, and seriously calls into 
question the widely accepted notion of the relevant literature that the Miskitu responded 
to the resettlement campaign with massive resentment of the Revolutionary government. 
In fact, the resettlement appears to have merely fomented distrust from the onlookers, and 
became their main avenue of attack in garnering international support to discredit the 
Sandinista regime.  
 
MISURA and MISURASATA 
                                                        
90 Levie, The People Speak, 166.  
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     Of the Miskitu who remained in Nicaragua, many originally supported MISURA. 
However, serious fragmentation arose within MISURA’s leadership, concerning its 
operation as an auxiliary of the contras, who only desired to overthrow the Nicaraguan 
government and demonstrated no concern for Miskitu interests. This decisive split proved 
most prominent between Fagoth and Rivera, and led to Rivera’s imprisonment. Upon 
release from prison, Rivera fled to Costa Rica and reorganized MISURASATA. Luciano 
Baracco claims that “Rivera’s split from Fagoth appears to have been informed by a 
desire to distance Miskitu demands from the CIA anti-communist agenda that informed 
the FDN and to remain focused on MISURASATA’s original programme for 
autonomy.”91 Rather than using a new name for the organization, he wanted to 
demonstrate his willingness to again unite with the Sandinistas. Fagoth planned on 
assassinating him and the others who dissented him, including Ariel Zuniga, Fagoth’s 
brother in law, after the Honduran guard released them, and they fled to Costa Rica. 
     From the outset of MISURASATA’s reincarnation, Rivera did not use the 
ethnocentric, anti-communist, and separate-nation rhetoric of Fagoth. However, he had 
neither the political experience nor hold on the church like Fagoth.92 He also operated in 
Costa Rica, further away from the large Miskitu populations in northeast Nicaragua than 
MISURA close by in Honduras. As a result, MISURASATA proved unable to garner 
                                                        
91 Luciano Baracco “We Fought for our Land: Miskitu insurgency and the struggle for 
autonomy on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast (1981-1987)” in AlterNative, Vol. 7 no. 3 
(2011), 233-245.  
92 Rivera was not revered as a charismatic and politically persuasive person, as was 
Fagoth. Reyes discusses that this made it hard for Rivera to gain a lot of support at first in 
Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 39-40. Furthermore, similar sentiments are noted in Meringer, 
The Local Politics of Indigenous Self-Representation, 8-9.  
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broad support until Fagoth’s traitorous behavior was realized beyond the leadership of the 
organizations, at the community level. 
     Rivera’s dismissal from MISURA, creation of his own indigenous organization, and 
subsequent attempts to gain legitimization made it apparent to the Miskitu that Fagoth 
and the U.S. had betrayed them. One Miskitu combatant, in an interview with Luciano 
Baracco, said “we thought we were fighting to defend our territory, but we were being 
used by other interests.”93 While it appears as though most in Nicaragua sided with 
Rivera, Fagoth already had several thousand Miskitu men fighting for him, and aid and 
arms from the U.S. to enable violent resistance. Though most of them continued fighting 
for Fagoth, because dissent would likely result in execution, it is clear that they 
maintained their stance of fighting to re-attain the rights granted by the Sandinista 
government, not overthrow or separate from it. They also largely came to regard Fagoth 
as a traitor. Miskitu support for MISURA or MISURASATA changed back and forth 
depending on their perception of the state of the war.94  
      In an interview with a writer for the New York Times, Rivera comments on his 
decision to sever ties with Fagoth and MISURA. “The F.D.N. has been very hostile and 
aggressive toward us,’ he said. ‘They consider us an enemy because we maintain our                                                         
93 Anonymous A, in an interview with Luciano Baracco about the corruption of Fagoth, 
from Luciano Baracco,“We Fought for our Land: Miskitu insurgency and the struggle for 
autonomy on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast (1981-1987)” in AlterNative, Vol. 7 no. 3, 2011, 
(233-245). 
94 For example, Hale makes the following claim: “Although Rivera had greater 
legitimacy in the international political arena, and a more coherent programme, his 
position cost him political support at the base. Once having chosen the armed alternative, 
Miskitu combatants could only survive with a constant flow of material and supplies. As 
Rivera cut himself off from the CIA and agreed to negotiate with the Nicaraguan 
government (1984), many former MISURASATA units shifted loyalties to MISURA or 
the FDN to ensure their military sustenance.” Hale, “Institutional Struggle, Conflict and 
Reconciliation,” 122. 
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independent positions and will not become soldiers in someone else’s army… I am not a 
contra,’ he said. ‘We are fighting for our rights, not to overthrow the Sandinistas.’95 This 
claim displays the increasingly popular sentiment amongst the Miskitu that Fagoth had 
betrayed them by selling Miskitu aims to the U.S. government, and evinces their 
perceptive understanding of the political conditions leading to their resistance, which all 
along tended to portray the desire to reclaim the rights granted them by the Sandinistas 
and to be able to integrate into the Revolutionary programme on their own terms. A 
necessary prerequisite for uniting again with the central government was to be 
represented by the organization that shaped its aims around Miskitu best interests. This is 
why Rivera ended up accumulating increasing support amongst the general Miskitu 
populace.  
      Rivera lacked the resources to continue fighting through refusing FDN or U.S. 
government aid and arms, so he joined forces with ARDE (Democratic Revolutionary 
Alliance), a counterrevolutionary group fronted by an ex-Sandinista guerrilla 
commander, Eden Pastora. Pastora similarly refused to fight for the contras due to their 
ties with ex-Somocistas and the U.S. government.96 However, he also desired to 
overthrow the Sandinista government. The irony of Rivera beginning a non-revolutionary 
struggle against the Sandinistas from Costa Rica that necessitated support from a separate 
counterrevolutionary struggle shows just how much Miskitu resistance depended upon 
outside forces for its enablement. The Miskitu simply lacked the necessary means to head 
                                                        
95 Brooklyn Rivera, as quoted by Stephen Kinzer. Miskito Leader Reports Help From 
Europe, in New York Times September 17, 1985; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The 
New York Times (1851-2009) with Index (1851-1993), A10. 
96 Vilas, Carlos. State, Class, and Ethnicity, 118.  
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their struggle alone, and it is understandable that historians have often subsumed general 
Miskitu aims under the motives articulated by the organizations with which they tied. 
 
1984 National Elections and Sandinista Ideological Reorientation  
     In preparation for the November elections, the Sandinista government underwent a 
radical ideological shift in their response to the “Indian problem,” which became known 
instead as an “ethnic question.” Hale estimates that the desire to accumulate more popular 
support throughout the Coast prompted the change in policy and practice, as the 
Sandinistas viewed every vote critical in the election of a war-torn state that might be too 
close for comfort.97 Dunbar-Ortiz, on the other hand, emphasizes the government’s 
genuine commitment to fulfilling Miskitu desires as motivating the adjustment.98  
Ultimately, both assessments appear correct. Three years of war with the Miskitu taught 
the Sandinistas a lot about their shortcomings in treating the Miskitu and escalating 
conflict. Furthermore, Rivera’s split with Fagoth and reincarnation of MISURASATA 
provided a viable avenue through which negotiations for peace might ensue. Instead of 
treating the Miskitu as a problematic ethnic-minority through repression, the Sandinistas 
altogether dropped the term “ethnicity” from their rhetoric, removed most of the troops 
occupying various villages, and significantly decreased the number of Miskitu arrests. 
The intensity of conflict thus lowered temporarily and the Sandinistas could now 
legitimately evince its fair treatment of the Miskitu to the international community. The 
specifics of this ideological re-orientation are further explicated in part III.  
                                                        
97 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 148. 
98 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 247. 
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     In June 1984, the Sandinista government sponsored the creation of MISATAN 
(Miskitu Asia Takanka Nicaragua)99 from a group of pro-Sandinista Miskitu in the 
asentamientos and hoped that it could emerge as the main interlocutor with the 
government, but it failed to ever garner broad Miskitu support outside of Tasba Pri,100 
which still predominantly sympathized with MISURA or MISURASATA. MISATAN 
dissolved within two years of its inception, as its representative body became embittered 
to the Sandinista government’s negotiations with MISURA, while maintaining that it 
could never garner broad support if other indigenous rights organizations simultaneously 
negotiated with the central government for a return to peace. 
     The Sandinistas emerged from the elections victorious by a significant margin, and in 
a study included in State, Class, and Ethnicity in Nicaragua Vilas tentatively claims that 
48% of the Miskitu populace that cast votes supported the Sandinistas.101 It is quite 
surprising that no other source makes reference to this study. Perhaps other commentators 
on the subject omitted such studies from their research because the results seriously call 
into question the typical assessment that the Miskitu unanimously resented the Sandinista 
government. The Sandinistas responded to their democratically legitimized sovereignty 
over the state with much enthusiasm, and officially resumed dialogue with 
MISURASATA in December 1984. Rivera made public to the international community                                                         
99 In English, roughly Miskitu of the Atlantic Coast United with Nicaragua. 
100 Vilas, State, Ethnicity, and Revolution, 155. 
101 This study was conducted by Judy Butler in La Costa voto. Los Costenos y las 
elecciones, included in Carlos M. Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity in Nicaragua: 
Capitalist Modernization and Revolutionary Change on the Atlantic Coast, trans. Susan 
Norwood (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 177. This appears to be the 
only study of its kind to date. The results perplexed Vilas, who envisioned far lower 
Miskitu support for the FSLN. However, it must be understood that nearly a third of the 
80,000 Miskitu who lived in Nicaragua at the time of the Triumph remained in Honduras, 
while many of those remaining in Nicaragua likely did not participate in the elections.  
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that he desired working for peace in collaboration with the central government. Overall, 
the higher than expected Miskitu support for the government evinced in the national 
elections provided proof that not all Miskitu shared the counterrevolutionary motives of 
Fagoth, and imbued the government with the perception that a return to peace proved 
more than viable.  
     The views espoused by Miskitu concerning their opinions of the revolutionary 
government evince an insightful understanding of the political conditions at play, whether 
or not they supported the Sandinistas. For example, one Miskitu man expressed optimism 
that the villages of the Coast would resume the progress that characterized the first year 
and a half following the triumph, and blamed Fagoth and the Contras for impeding such 
progress. “According to the government plans, things are going to get much better. I 
believe so, especially when this war is over. Myself, I’m not in the militia. I can’t have 
anything to do with the military.”102 Not only do these sentiments display more trust in 
the government than most sources acknowledge, they additionally evince the broad 
Miskitu desire for a return to peace, which will be further explained in Part III.  
     Many left for Honduras due to economic conditions and fear imbued from 
counterrevolutionary propaganda. The Coast had only one radio station, Septiembre de 
15, which was orchestrated by Fagoth and served as a vehement anti-communist 
propaganda machine. One man stated “In 1980, 1981, people came across to us from 
Honduras. They told us that the Sandinistas were going to kill us. They said that the 
Sandinistas were going to destroy all of the Miskitu people. They said that the 
Sandinistas hated us and that they wanted our land, so they were going to wipe us out. 
                                                        
102 Levie, The People Speak, 161. 
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They told us… in Honduras… we would be safe.”103 Others grew embittered with the 
Sandinistas due to the poor job market and never enough meat or milk at the markets.104 
Fagoth’s propaganda campaign furthermore fomented disdain for the “red-faced 
totalitarian regime.”105 Until 1985, this propaganda proved largely successful in 
engraining Miskitu with fear of the Sandinistas, yet as dialogue with the Sandinistas 
resumed and the Miskitu became aware of Fagoth’s alignment with the U.S. government 
for personal benefit, increasing numbers of Miskitu disregarded the anti-Sandinista 
propaganda as “big lies from big heads.”106 
 
Conclusion 
     Thus, it appears as though the first years of conflict were characterized by serious 
Miskitu fragmentation from above and below, that even the vehement anti-Sandinistas 
feared the contras and Fagoth’s MISURA more. The broad dissatisfaction with U.S. 
government support of the Miskitu for ulterior motives reveal, by this point, a blunt 
rejection of Anglo-affinities and desire to continue resistance on their own terms, for their 
own interests. On the surface, these notions understandably appear to be ethnically 
charged, yet upon further inspection, the Sandinista ideological reorientation stopped 
                                                        
103 Levie, The People Speak, 146. 
104 For example, an old woman interviewed by Levie passionately insisted that the 
Sandinistas broke her hip: “I went to the store to buy some meat. And, as usual there was 
nothing there… I was so angry with them—so disgusted—that I fell into a hole in the 
road… So you see, they did this to me. They broke my hip” from Levie, The People 
Speak, 148.  
105 Fagoth often commented that the government was showing the red face of 
totalitarianism. One example of this is a Miskito-language radio broadcast by Steadman 
Fagoth from Honduras, shown in Levie, The People Speak, 139. 
106 Rafaga and others commonly refer to Fagoth as a traitor and claim that he and the U.S. 
only told “big lies.” For example, Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 98-9. 
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treating the Miskitu as an ethnic problem, and the Miskitu responded varyingly, but 
increasing support for the Sandinista government is apparent. Moreover, the fact that the 
Creoles displayed similar sentiments as the Miskitu, and also fought against the 
Sandinistas, evinces the conception that costeno resistance fought solely for their fair 
inclusion into the Revolutionary programme and to defend their distinctive cultural 
customs, as a multi-ethnic contingent. 
     The scholarship to date largely ignores these notions. While Dunbar-Ortiz holds that 
the only Miskitu who fought were forced to fight and that most were Pro-Sandinista, 
Nietschmann argues that every Miskitu considered the Sandinistas as “rabid dogs,” and 
the vast majority dissented to inclusion in the state.107 Vilas maintains that the Miskitu 
unanimously hated the Sandinistas because they still lacked a political consciousness, 
which they masked with an ethnic consciousness, while openly referring to the Indians as 
backwards.108 Hale, on the other hand, asserts that the Miskitu displayed perceptive 
political views, though they yet remained contradictory.  
     In sum, the various scholars continued fervidly defending their preconceived notions 
of the factors leading to conflict, even though this period is actually marked by an 
increasing desire for a return to peace and a favorable response to their re-election. 
However, this is not to say that all Miskitu supported the Sandinistas, if even a majority, 
but by the time broad awareness of Fagoth’s ulterior motives ensued, marked particularly 
by increasing support for Rivera and MISURASATA, the general perceptions embodied 
by the Miskitu remained largely at odds with MISURA. It is surprising that the relevant 
                                                        
107 Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 30. 
108 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity, 135-138.  
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literature neglects to consider the possibility of fragmentation beyond the leadership of 
the Indigenous organizations, at the community level.   
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Part III: Returning Home with Written Rights      
     In 1985 Rafaga replaced his gun with a pen, leaving the bush for the negotiating table. 
He decided to fight for peace after visiting with the “old heads” and people of thirty 
Miskitu villages, who unanimously expressed the desire for the bloodshed to end so that 
people could return home—from the bush, from Honduras, and from the asentamientos. 
Fagoth and Rivera continued to wage war from Honduras and Costa Rica, and what they 
lacked in popular support they made up for in power. Rafaga began a tedious process of 
dialogue with the Sandinista cadres, the leadership of the various indigenous rights 
organizations, and community members.  
I explained to them my reasons for quitting the fight and my resentments toward 
the MISURA and KISAN leadership for its mistreatment of the Indian refugees in 
Honduras. I was trying to bring them over to our way of working for victory 
without more shedding of Indian blood. I told them about the old heads’ hopes for 
peace and reminded them that this was our traditional way of living—the way of 
taking advice from our old chiefs, not from leaders in Honduras who were being 
advised by CIA or from leaders in Costa Rica who were being advised by North 
American anthropologists and lawyers.109  
Even though most Miskitu by this point resented Fagoth as a self-serving traitor and 
believed that he did not represent the interests of the Miskitu, they had yet to receive the 
rights for which they felt obligated to fight. Through his ties with the U.S. government, 
Fagoth had the means to continue making war.   
                                                        
109 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 163. 
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     Rafaga often spoke on behalf of the Miskitu with members of the Sandinista 
government to bring an end to the civil war. This process proved difficult to achieve as 
the countless meetings often ended in stalemate and confusion, but Rafaga remained 
optimistic. The opposing sides met to assure that however bitter their differences 
remained, by no means were they irreconcilable. However, many of the boys with whom 
he struggled to survive—sharing everything from the last piece of bread to the final 
cigarette—remained in the bush. How could they assure that the documents guaranteeing 
their rights could be trusted, that the government which betrayed them would abide by 
the laws it enacted? 
     Rafaga met most often with FSLN Minister of the Interior, Tomas Borge, for whom 
he developed sincere respect. “In all of my dealings with him in behalf of my people and 
on a personal level, he has every time kept his word and demonstrated a genuine desire to 
understand our problems completely.”110 Borge expressed a deep commitment to 
restoring the war-torn communities and granting the Miskitu the rights they demanded. 
But peace could only come with trust in the governmental provisions. Rafaga claimed 
that “autonomy should not be just a piece of paper with ink on it that is thrown into the 
wastebasket when the war is over,”111 as he and many others felt had been done after the 
triumph. Thus, the means for bringing about peace had to start at the community level.  
     Regardless of those continuing to fight, the negotiations mutually treated the 
protection and repair of the communities as the top priority. If the Miskitu’s daily life 
could return to functioning as it did in the initial days of promise after the Triumph, then 
perhaps the militancy would wane. Cease-fires in the war-torn villages were enacted. By                                                         
110 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 161. 
111 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 172. 
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1986, the Contras no longer constituted a severe threat to the vanguard regime, which 
allowed the central government to re-allocate essential resources to the Coast. 
     Gradually, increasing numbers of Miskitu laid down their arms. This resulted from 
four equally influential factors: i) Miskitu awareness of the corruption of their leaders, 
and ii) that they had no realistic chances of ever winning the war, iii) the firm insistence 
of the “old heads” and other community members that the bloodshed must end, and iv) 
the Sandinistas’ improved image amongst the Indians. By the end of 1987, the two sides 
achieved tentative peace with a new Nicaraguan Constitution that included the Autonomy 
Law. The process towards peace is marked by the resumption of dialogue between the 
Sandinista government and the indigenous rights organizations representing the Miskitu 
in December 1984, various cease-fire agreements with Miskitu villages, providing 
resources to the Coast for its redevelopment, allowing the Miskitu from the 
asientamentos to return home, and a string of bilateral agreements eventually written into 
law.  
     In this section I examine the conditions under which the Miskitu laid down arms and 
returned home from the bush. From the beginning of negotiations in December 1984 to 
the hesitant peace achieved nearly three years later in October 1987. Indeed, the peace 
accords doubled the length of the war. No matter how much the Miskitu desired peace 
they would only stop fighting with firmly secured rights. I contend that peace prevailed in 
much the same way it originally deteriorated—at the grassroots level, through the advice 
of the old heads. Furthermore, this period perhaps best evinces Miskitu heterogeneity 
through the intense fragmentation amongst the leadership of the various indigenous rights 
factions and Miskitus’ varying responses. Ultimately, the Miskitu remained rather 
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skeptical of the rights they received, but the government responded adequately enough to 
the Miskitu demands for them to justify ending the war.   
 
Resumption of Dialogue 
     The resumption of dialogue occurred through discussions with all of the indigenous 
organizations and community leaders. Miskitu agreed to discuss a return to peace with 
the central government due to their broad acknowledgement of their corrupt leadership, 
the improvements made by the central government since their ideological re-orientation, 
and the low odds of winning the war. These perceptions shall reveal that Miskitu ethnic 
identity played a minimal role and remained ideologically divided beyond their general 
agreement about these perceptions. 
      Overall, Vilas, Nietschmann, and Hale posit decidedly different views about the 
nature of dialogue in returning to peace. Whereas Vilas argues that the Sandinistas 
legitimately met Miskitu demands112, Nietschmann claims that the Sandinistas unjustly 
coerced them into compliance113, and Hale contends somewhere in between, explaining 
that the Sandinistas demarcated the political space within which negotiations could 
resume, and that the Sandinistas ultimately granted the Miskitu many of their desired 
concessions, but also tricked them into agreement.114 I tend to agree more along the lines 
with Vilas but also believe that the Miskitu and their leadership demonstrated a keen 
                                                        
112 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity, 142. For example, Vilas claims “the reformulation 
of the policies and programs for the Coast and the gradual abandonment of revolutionary 
ethnocentrism and indigenist chauvinism set the stage for a more open relationship 
between the FSLN and the revolutionary government, on the one hand, and Costeno 
leaders, on the other.” 
113 Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 65-66.  
114 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 174. 
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understanding of the laws they ended up agreeing to. This notion is supported by 
Rafaga’s consistent references to the “bilateral” agreements and his satisfaction in 
them.115  
     As described in Section II, the elections held by the FSLN in 1984 and their 
overwhelming victory, for whatever reason, elicited a radical ideological shift in their 
treatment of the Miskitu. Tomas Borge, Minister of the Interior for the FSLN assumed 
the chief role in negotiating with the Miskitu. The Sandinistas’ new platform for the 
Coast ultimately determined the political space116 within which negotiations ensued and 
aimed to further legitimize FSLN sovereignty over the Coast through broadening Miskitu 
support. The Sandinistas intended on achieving peace through “the achievement of 
‘hegemony’ through ‘political-ideological struggle.’”117 The government enacted this 
through offering substantial aid to recuperate the Miskitu villages and providing the 
essential resources to the Coast: the rations, medical care, and infrastructural 
improvement that originally brought the people to adopt the revolutionary ideology. The 
resumption of these provisions and the community members’ overwhelming desire to 
return to peace enabled the process of negotiations and eventually allowed the bullets to 
rest. 
     In order to improve support at the local level, Borge entirely replaced the tropa 
(government officials assigned to the Coast), with older and more educated members who 
integrated more thoroughly into the community.118 The new tropa members went to 
church and participated in the Miskitu festivities while also respecting dissent for the                                                         
115 For example, see Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 155. 
116 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 174. 
117 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 171. 
118 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 170. 
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Sandinistas to a much higher degree. The number of Miskitu arrests decreased 
significantly, and punishments proved more lenient.119 Thus, through becoming more 
involved in the Miskitu community, the Sandinista government came off far less 
“assimilationist” to the Miskitu than they had in the escalation to conflict. In fact, it 
appears as though the tropa attempted to assimilate to Miskitu culture, and did so rather 
successfully. This significantly improved the perception amongst Miskitu about the 
central government, but still came far short of eliciting their full trust.   
     The emergence of Miskito awareness about the corruption of their leadership largely 
enabled the Sandinistas to improve their image to the Indians. Though I mentioned this in 
Section II, the full depth of this corruption proved evident in 1985. Rafaga contended that 
“all these realizations about the corruption of our leaders moved us toward dialogue with 
the Sandinistas.”120 General Miskitu resentment of the conditions of life in Honduras, of 
Fagoth’s personal use of funds allocated to him for the resistance, and Miskitu discovery 
of Libro Unico, Fagoth’s secret journal from the CIA dictating his every move.121 
However, the extent to which the Miskitu resistance depended upon U.S. support 
necessitated their alignment with Fagoth in order to fulfill their harrowed battle for Indian 
rights, no matter how much they resented him122. Reconciling this contradiction proved 
tricky in the years to come.  
     This ultimately led to Fagoth’s forced resignation from MISURA, from which the 
Miskitu formed KISAN. The Miskitu in Honduras at the time, explained Rafaga, tried to 
                                                        
119 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 171. 
120 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 142. 
121 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 145. 
122 For example, Vilas and Hale both comment on the necessity of U.S. government aid in 
enabling the Miskitu to continue the war. 
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get Rivera to lead KISAN, which would effectively cut all Miskitu ties with the U.S. and 
unite the existing indigenous organizations. But he refused to show up to the meeting. As 
a result, those present at the assembly elected Fagoth’s mentee, Wycliffe Diego, as the 
organization’s president.123 A group of KISAN members in favor of peace referred to 
their sector as KISAN por la Paz, with Rafaga as a chief leader, and created the first 
cease-fire for the war in the Miskitu village of Yulo in 1985. 
     Another important factor enabling dialogue between the Sandinistas and Miskitu to 
resume stemmed from the waning threat posed by the contras to overthrowing the 
Sandinista government. October 1985 marked the “Strategic Defeat” of the FDN. The 
Sandinista’s legitimate landslide victory in the election of 1984 and their increasing 
support amongst Nicaraguans seriously damaged U.S. government propaganda 
campaigns to decrease support for the government. “From that point on, despite massive, 
continuous infusions of U.S. aid (both covert and congressionally approved) and repeated 
efforts at reorganization and revitalization, the contras never recovered the initiative as an 
offensive military force.” Though the FDN could forever remain a thorn in the side of the 
Sandinista government, they no longer constituted a legitimate threat to its overthrow.   
     Rafaga perceptively verifies the futility of their fight. “I believed that if all of the 
communities of the Atlantic Coast were begging for peace and we guerrilla boys kept 
fighting, we could have no victory. I felt it was better to obey the old heads, abide with 
them, and cooperate with their ideas.”124 Most Miskitu echo this realization, and no 
longer felt justified in waging a war that could only result in more casualties. In this 
context, then, the process of dialogue can be understood.                                                         
123 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 143-4.  
124 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 164. 
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     Section II illustrates the conditions under which the central government desired to 
begin negotiations with the Costa Rica based MISURASATA. The two sides met in 
December 1984, the first of four meetings, which began with promise and ended in 
MISURASATA’s re-escalation of conflict. Talks would not occur again until 1988. The 
failure of negotiations with MISURASATA and MISURA’s vehement denial to engage 
with the Sandinistas in any way but through war sparked the central government’s 
attempt to create a new indigenous rights organization. In June 1984, they organized 
MISATAN from a group of pro-Sandinista Miskitu in the asentamientos and hoped that it 
could step up as the main interlocutor with the government, but it failed to ever garner 
broad Miskitu support125, which still predominantly sympathized with MISURA or 
MISURASATA.  
     By July 1985 the FSLN conceived a tentative autonomy document that they presented 
to the Miskitu at village meetings.126 From this came the cease-fire of Yulo. This cease 
fire marked the first notable agreement between the two sides. Rafaga attended the 
meeting with twenty-nine old heads and was proud of the progress. “We made a bilateral 
agreement with Borge that we Indian fighters would not be taking any more guns or 
bullets from Costa Rica and Honduras. The government, in turn, promised to give us 
every kind of military materiel we should need to defend Yulo.”127 This re-allocation of 
the necessary provisions to the Coast furthermore increased government support. As a 
result, cease-fires like the one achieved in Yulo were enacted gradually throughout 
several other villages in the ensuing months. These agreements took the war out of the 
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communities and appear to have significantly improved Miskitu trust in the Sandinista 
government. 
     Various newspapers in the U.S. frequently published articles about the negotiations 
with interviews from Rivera during which he always claimed to be Nicaraguan and to 
want to participate in dialogue towards peace.128 But the two had reversed conditions for 
dialogue to resume: The Sandinistas required the Miskitu to lay down arms before 
resuming talks, while the Miskitu leadership first wanted their rights.129 This helps 
further evince Hale’s contention that the Sandinistas created the political space within 
which negotiations could resume.  
     However, Hale furthermore contends that the Miskitu were more or less confused by 
the documents they signed into agreement, and that peace ensued in a rather uncertain 
manner. This view fails to adequately take into account the differences between the 
leadership and the people. Though Hale states that it started at the community level and 
eventually convinced the leadership to start moving towards peace, he also holds that 
Sandy Bay’s deeply entrenched alignment with MISURA was representative of all 
Miskitu communities. This does not appear to be the case, as Rafaga contended nearly all 
of the Miskitu perceived the representational organizations as corrupt. They wanted peace 
but would come to it in no uncertain terms. Once their rights had been acknowledged, 
                                                        
128 For example, refer to the New York Times articles, published, in particular, by Stephen 
Kinzer, Phillip Russell, James LeMoyne, Shirley Christian, and Penny Lernoux between 
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they dropped their arms. The Miskitu demonstrated a keen understanding of the political 
framework during this process.  
 
Miskitu against Miskitu 
     Perhaps the most critical factor leading to the overwhelming Miskitu desire to end the 
war was Miskitu fighting Miskitu. In fact all of the Conterrevolutionary allegations 
against the Miskitu, as Nietschmann argues occurred for reasons of the Sandinistas unjust 
policies of incursion and annexation – were actually committed by the Contras. This 
pitted the Miskitu in an uncomfortable place of having to trust one or the other 
institutions that both betrayed them. This led to the Miskitu playing the Sandinista 
government, KISAN, and MISURASATA. One of Baracco’s interviewees made the 
following insightful claim  
So after 6 years of heavy fighting, and Miskitu being killed on each side, there 
was a point when the leadership, the elders, intervened to say we can’t just kill 
each other… we saw we were fighting against brothers coming from Honduras 
and the elders intervened and they said ‘no’.130 
The old heads largely ordained the return to peace, who served as the only remaining 
leadership for the Miskitu that had yet to betray them. Rafaga echoes similar sentiments 
in coming to characterize Miskitu versus Miskitu conflict as unacceptable, likening it to 
behavior like animals. 
     Miskitu agency at the local level is evinced by a sizeable portion of the Miskitu who 
were satisfied with neither the central government nor the indigenous organizations                                                         
130 From an interview with “Anonymous A” conducted by Luciano Baracco in Puerto 
Cabezas, 2009, as transcribed in Baracco, “We Fought for Our Land” 242.  
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negotiating with them. As a result, the dialogue aimed at achieving peace also imbued a 
sense of dissatisfaction that did not stop “with passive dissent but motivated constant 
semiclandestine political action as well, such as sending food to the bush people and 
secretly housing field commanders who visited the community. The same people who 
engaged in this ‘resistance’ often participated fully in autonomia and thereby contributed 
directly to its success.”131 The organizations did not stop with their allegations of 
Sandinista human rights abuses either, even though the leadership of the indigenous 
organizations committed all of the allegations they made against the Sandinista 
government, in order to gain enough political legitimacy to continue the war. This 
fragmentation fostered varying displays of Miskitu agency. 
     Furthermore, the mutually hostile outlets for resistance trapped the Miskitu with the 
frightening and difficult decision to either remain in Honduras or return to Nicaragua. In 
an article for the New York Times published in August 1986, author James LeMoyne 
states: 
The Miskitos are torn by internal disputes and seem increasingly uncertain of their 
future. Several told a recent visitor that they were worried that they might never 
be able to return to Nicaragua. Some Indian leaders said they fear that their people 
could become like the Hmong and Meo tribesmen in Asia - indigenous people 
drafted into a war by the C.I.A. and later abandoned.132 
                                                        
131 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 191.  
132 James LeMoyne, “Miskitos are Arguing with Themselves” New York Times, August 
3, 1986, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009), with Index 
(1851-1922), A4. 
 78 
Morris and Churchill’s contribution to the literature makes the same comparison except 
replaces LeMoyne’s “could” with “already did.”133 Until the ratification of the Autonomy 
Law postdating the aforementioned article by half a year, a large contingent of refugees 
remained in Honduras. 
 
The Autonomy Law 
     The ratification of the Autonomy Law in May of 1987 allowed the vast majority of the 
Miskitu remaining abroad to come home, and at least nominally put an end to the war. 
The return began in late 1985. 12,000 returned home until 8,000 left for Honduras again 
from a KISAN terrorist campaign which was blamed on the Sandinistas. The Peace and 
Autonomy commissions between 1985 and 1987 attempted to come to a bilateral 
agreement, which progressed slowly. In these commissions, each village elected its own 
leader to be sent to negotiate with the FSLN, and eventually achieve a local cease-fire 
agreement. In 1987 more than 120 villages signed and 19,000 Miskitu had been 
repatriated.  
     Hale includes an interpretation of the specific legislature of the Autonomy Law as it 
compared to the rhetorical demands made by the Miskitu, through categorizing four 
specific types of Miskitu demands: territory, economic control, political exclusivity, and 
cultural exclusivity. He then explains each demand and the resulting rights granted by the 
Autonomy Law going to show that the demands and laws are both ambivalent in a few 
cases. For example, the bilateral law guarantees the rights to the communal lands that 
have traditionally belonged to Costeno ethnic groups, stipulating that those villages may 
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retain all profit from the exploitation of resources, while the government retains joint 
custody with the Costenos over villages further inland which are not considered to be 
traditionally inhabited by indigenous peoples. Accordingly, it grants the right to a 
regionally autonomous council comprised of members from each ethnic group as elected 
by Costenos. The council members are promised the right to preserve their culture 
without interference from the central government, while also sharing power with the 
State in upholding regional autonomy in both regions’ ultimate subservience to the 
federal enactments of the State constitution.134 Thus, the Autonomy Law met Costeno 
demands for political representation and cultural preservation in a manner similar to the 
U.S. government’s political distinctions between local and federal sovereignty, and 
appears to have achieved broad Miskitu support.  
     The fact that the government waited to ratify its proposed constitution and the 
revisions made along the way until it had the support of the Miskitu people illustrates the 
commitment of the central government to acknowledging and respecting Miskitu 
demands. Vilas claims that the Miskitu had no clear concept of autonomy at first, and that 
it developed slowly focusing on land, resources, language, self-government, preservation 
of their cultures, religion, relations with the central government, the powers of the 
regional governments, and modes of participation.135 However, the Miskitu appeared to 
display clearly defined goals for autonomy to begin with, as will be shown in the 
description of the Autonomy Law.  
     Various newspapers agencies in the U.S. and Nicaragua including the New York Times 
and Envio frequently published articles in 1986 and 1987 about the proposed autonomy                                                         
134 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 197.  
135 Vilas, State, Class, and Ethnicity in Nicaragua, 171. 
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law and include interviews from Rivera in which he always claimed to be Nicaraguan and 
to want to participate in dialogue towards peace, but more importantly, that he would not 
order his men to lay down their arms until the Sandinistas granted them their inalienable 
rights.136 But the two had reversed conditions for dialogue to resume: The Sandinistas 
required the Miskitu to lay down arms before resuming talks, while the Miskitu 
leadership first wanted their rights. This helps further evince Hale’s contention that the 
Sandinistas created the political space within which negotiations could resume.  
     However, Hale additionally contends that the Miskitu were more or less confused by 
the documents they signed into agreement, and that peace ensued in a rather uncertain 
manner. This view fails to adequately take into account the differences between the 
leadership and the people. Though Hale states that it started at the community level and 
eventually convinced the leadership to start moving towards peace, he also holds that 
Sandy Bay’s deeply entrenched alignment with MISURA was representative of all 
Miskitu communities. This does not appear to be the case, as Rafaga contended nearly all 
of the Miskitu perceived the representational organizations as corrupt. They wanted peace 
but would come to it in no uncertain terms. Once their rights had been acknowledged, 
they dropped their arms. The Miskitu demonstrated a keen understanding of the political 
framework during this process. In this sense, I tend to agree more with the interpretation 
that Hale argues against: The Sandinistas improved their image enough to the Miskitu 
and adequately enough granted their demands to end the war.  
     In examining the law proposed in May, 1987 and ratified with the Nicaraguan 
constitution months later in November, Hale perceptively notes that the Principles and                                                         
136 “Miskitos on the Rio Coco: Who’s Political Football Are They: Miskitu Fighting 
Amongst Themselves,” in Envio, Vol. 5, No. 59, (May, 1986): 14-27. 
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Policies for the Exercise of the Autonomy Rights of the Indian Peoples and Communities 
of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua “shows just how far the revolution and costeno leaders 
had come in understanding one another” in reaffirming the unity and indivisibility of the 
Nicaraguan state, and ratifying the struggle against all forms of racism, ethnocentrism, 
separatism, and hegemony, and “affirms the right to collective and individual property on 
the lands Costenos have traditionally occupied” while demonstrating respect for the 
procedures “for transmission of property and land use.”137 Though Hale goes on to claim 
that this bilateral agreement was more or less forced upon the Miskitu by the Sandinistas 
in the political space they demarcated, the Miskitu perhaps achieved their highest level of 
unanimity since the Triumph. Rafaga contends that “for me, autonomy is not a gift from 
the Sandinistas. The autonomy of Tawaswalpa138 is a historical right that the Sandinista 
government has recognized… This was a great step for us.”139 Accordingly, whether or 
not the Miskitu were prodded into accepting the laws proposed by the Sandinista 
government, they struggled for nearly three years to make sure it aligned with their 
desires. Once the Miskitu community leaders finally achieved satisfaction with the 
legislation, the Miskitu began returning home en masse.  
      Southbound Miskitu flocked by the thousands across the Rio Coco officially 
changing their status as refugees to repatriates. By the end of 1987 around 20,000 Miskitu 
had returned home, while another 10,000 made the cross in the ensuing months. Fagoth 
temporarily moved to Miami, and the US government ceased its counterrevolutionary 
operations, though they continued imposing crippling economic sanctions on Nicaragua. 
                                                        
137 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 171. 
138 Traditional name of the Atlantic Coast in the Miskitu language.  
139 Reyes and Wilson, Rafaga, 172. 
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Nevertheless, the process of revitalizing their communities recommenced with the same 
gusto in the year following the triumph. They secured their admittance to the law, and 
they demonstrated pride in their Nicaraguan identity. 
 
Conclusion 
     In sum, this period has been far less discussed by the literature, as Vilas, Nietschmann, 
and Hale respectively are the only sources covering the entire war. Furthermore, very few 
primary sources have appeared after 1985, so Rafaga is one of the few from which I 
could develop my argument. Nevertheless, Hale and Vilas both contend that ethnic 
militancy and Anglo-affinities abruptly departed from the Miskitu psyche. They do a 
good job of noting the desire of the community members to return to peace and the 
fragmentation of the leadership, but for some reason again neglect to mention the 
divisions of the community level. It appears as though the Miskitu were trapped between 
their support for the structure of the Revolutionary government and their loved ones who 
died to secure their rights. While many like Rafaga eventually convinced the vast 
majority of refugees to return home and soldiers to drop their arms, not even the 
ratification of the Autonomy Law and nominal return to peace could fully erase disdain 
for the government. Nevertheless, the government did an adequate enough job of getting 
enough support and developing legal provisions for the seven-year war to finally end. 
     In fact, it appears as though the Miskitu adopted the same anti-imperialist perception 
of the U.S. government. Hale acknowledges that the influence of Anglo-affinities largely 
receded during the peace accords. I contend that this decrease happened long before 
though. Nevertheless, the Miskitu were caught in the contradictory notion of 
 83 
necessitating U.S. support to have the means for warfare and wanting to continue the 
fight on their own terms. They apparently demonstrated more of a willingness to obtain 
peace with the Sandinistas than accept further aligning with the ulterior motives of the 
U.S. government.  
     The Autonomy Law sufficiently addressed the Miskitu desire for regional autonomy 
and also allowed for more political representation at the local level throughout the Coast. 
Such considerations, when combined with the continuance of Sandinista aid to the region 
effectively enabled the Miskitu to return to peace while also considering the war a moral 
victory. Their fight indeed increased Coastal autonomy, gave them final say over their 
own land, and allowed for their mutual integration into a unified nation officially led 
under the legitimate and popularly elected central government, and protected by the laws 
of the new Constitution.  
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Conclusion 
     This study suggests that the Miskitu proved far more politically heterogeneous as a 
group and that the Sandinista government and later commentators on the subject have 
imposed an over-emphasized ethnic identity upon the Miskitu. Furthermore, it implies 
that the Miskitu held far different ideological reasons for fighting than the leadership of 
MISURA, and fought against the Sandinsitas to reclaim rights previously granted by the 
central government after the triumph, rather than attempting to create a separate nation on 
the Atlantic Coast. The implications of such claims are wide ranging, especially when 
considering their distance from the broad contentions articulated by the relevant 
literature. First, it places Miskitu agency on a higher plane by emphasizing the grassroots 
nature of their resistance. Second, it renders the Miskitu as more politically aware than 
most researchers contend by removing the conception that they were imbued by a 
contradictory and backwards consciousness. Finally, it solidifies their collective 
consciousness as more concerned with national identity than ethnic identity.  
     Indirectly, these conclusions furthermore suggest the influential roles played by 
unforeseen events and individuals in shaping the course of the narrative. These 
considerations are aimed to place more weight on near rather than distant events in 
retelling the Miskitu tale during their conflict with the Sandinistas and ultimately render 
the deterministic interpretations inadequate. Had Steadman Fagoth not assumed the lead 
role of MISURASATA and KISAN or without an accidental gunshot in the sacred 
Moravian church of Prinzapolka, it is quite plausible to assume that bloodshed would not 
have ensued.  
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     Broadly, the story of the Miskitu during the 1980s is unique in comparison to other 
indigenous groups in Central and Latin America, because of its retrospective success. 
They actually achieved their mutual integration into the nation of Nicaragua on their own 
terms, and the central government displayed far more commitment to fulfilling 
indigenous demands than any of its neighbors. In fact, during the negotiations towards 
peace, the Sandinistas and Miskitu desired to create the standard for other nations to 
follow in their treatment of indigenous citizens. The model the two groups mutually 
constructed undeniably deserves respect. The Autonomy Law and Nicaraguan 
Constitution of 1987 legislatively crafted a united nation with regional autonomy based 
on two distinct cultures, granting impressive political authority to both regions under a 
broad and inclusive sovereign body.  
     Moreover, the FSLN of Nicaragua also counts as an exceptional case in relation to all 
the revolutions of history. No other revolutionary vanguard so quickly held fair elections 
to prove its legitimacy, publicly acknowledged its own shortcomings, or altered its 
ideology along the way to progress its inclusivity for all demographic groups. Similarly, 
no other vanguard so respectfully handed over power after losing an election. The 
Sandinista insurrection serves as the quintessential social revolution, especially for Latin 
America. Likewise, the Miskitu resistance that necessitated their just inclusion into the 
revolutionary program was not in vain. Without taking up arms, it is likely they would 
not have achieved such a degree of autonomy, nor would the Sandinistas have been able 
to adequately include ethnic minorities into their ideological ontology.  
     Today, the Atlantic Coast is still economically destitute, while Nicaragua is the second 
poorest nation in the western Hemisphere. The FSLN lost the election of 1990 while 
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nearly half of the Miskitu populace who participated voted for the Sandinistas. The 
election of the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) reverted the progress made on the 
Coast and made it susceptible to unjust economic exploitation again. However, the 
Sandinistas reclaimed power in 1994 and have held onto it since, though most claim the 
FSLN has lost its sense of revolutionary justice under the increasing corruption of 
President Daniel Ortega. Ironically, Steadman Fagoth now occupies a minimal position 
within the FSLN. The Atlantic Coast still has the regional autonomy ratified in 1987, and 
the Miskitu have far better relations with the government than they did during the 1980s, 
but the process of redevelopment will likely take decades to achieve.  
 
 Research Limitations 
     This study proves limited in a few significant ways. First of all, and most importantly, 
I constructed my argument without ever setting foot in Nicaragua or any direct 
interaction with Miskitu. As a result, my conclusions are limited to the selections 
included in other researcher’s compilations of Miskitu sources. Though I believe the 
study adequately interprets the available sources, the legitimacy of such interpretations is 
inferior to direct interaction in the area. However, it is possible that commenting from 
afar allowed a more objective analysis due to the sensitivity of the subject that has thus 
far not lent much to impartiality. Nevertheless, sometimes even superior objectivity 
cannot adequately replace direct experience. Valuable historical interpretations often earn 
their respect from means other than objectivity.  
     Secondly, the significant departure from the conclusions of the authoritative figures of 
the subject serves as another limitation to the applied method of research. The 
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commentators have nearly unanimously found common ground in their estimations 
regarding Miskitu animosity for the Sandinista government and the momentous influence 
of Anglo-affinities and ethnic identity in determining the Miskitu reactions to the 
revolutionary government. Nevertheless, my departure from such interpretations is not 
without warrant. The Miskitu testaments steered me away from being able to agree with 
the interpretations offered by the non-Miskitu who either strongly supported the 
Sandinistas or the U.S. government. Sometimes it appears as though historical 
interpretations can only sufficiently address the events as they become further distanced 
by time. 
     Finally, the force with which I suggest the ways in which the Miskitu thought of 
themselves and attempt to address the composition of their distinct identity and collective 
consciousness is limited by its analysis through adherence to the western European ideal. 
The Miskitu culture, and most indigenous cultures for that matter, think in different terms 
and display a different, though equally complex, consciousness. As a result, it is difficult 
to accurately represent the ideologies of indigenous groups, but perhaps my research can 
contribute meaningfully to the relevant audience similarly attached to the western 
European model.  
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
     Future research ought to focus on the narratives of other ethnic groups of the Atlantic 
Coast, which have been scarcely considered. The findings of such research would 
undoubtedly improve analyses of Miskitu ethnic identity based on the degree to which 
the other groups, like the Creoles, aligned with Miskitu ideology. Furthermore, research 
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about the political ideological differences based on Miskitu age and gender would 
significantly advance the conceptions of Miskitu fragmentation. I have speculated that the 
women may have tended to support the Sandinistas more than Miskitu men based on the 
increased female agency and community involvement fostered by the revolutionary 
redevelopment of the Coast. Furthermore, those who went to Nicaragua were 
predominantly young men. The studies conducted on Miskitu gender thus far have 
addressed the rampancy of machismo throughout the Atlantic Coast, which is perhaps 
suggestive of why young men proved so willing to take up arms when the opportunity 
presented itself. In addition, research aiming to further understand Miskitu ethnic identity 
during the war would be quite beneficial to the relevant subject in order to replace the 
reduction of other types of indigenous identity to ethnicity, which dominates approaches 
thus far maintained. 
      In sum, the Miskitu call to arms against the Sandinista government and the long war 
that ensued resulted from complexities not yet adequately considered. Further research 
should undeniably contribute to the articulations thus far advanced and enhance our 
conceptions of such complexities that are inherent to every group of people and, 
similarly, every war. Successful social revolutions are few and far between in history, but 
resistance to them seemingly always occurs. Hopefully this study improves the 
considerations pertaining to such intricacies between ethnicity and revolution and allows 
future investigations of the subject to more satisfactorily acknowledge their full breadth 
in the Nicaraguan Revolution.  
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